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WHEN SHOULD CONTRACT LAW SUPPLY A 
LIABILITY RULE OR TERM?: Framing a 
Principle of Unification for Contracts 
Juliet P. Kostritsk-y * 
I. INTRODUCTION: JUSTIFYING LAW SUPPLIED RULES AND TERMS 
Nineteenth century formalism limited contract enforcement to privately 
negotiated terms.' The twentieth century has witnessed the expansion of 
several contracts doctrines, such as promissory estoppel and good faith, 
which have involved courts in supplying terms not expressly negotiated by 
the parties. The willingness of courts to intervene in incomplete contracts 
has increased with the recognition that it is difficult and costly for the parties 
to resolve all matters ex ante, particularly in long-term contracts.2 Some 
* John Homer Kapp Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University Law School. 
B.A. 1976 Harvard University; J.D. 1980 University of Wisconsin. This article is dedicated to 
Professor Ronald J. Coffey, a great teacher of ideas and intellectual mentor. An early version of 
this article was presented at the AALS Conference on Contracts in June, 1999. A draft of this 
paper was presented to a student colloquium at the University of Virginia Law School on February 
23, 2000. I am grateful to Dean Robert E. Scott and Professor Clayton P. Gillette for their 
comments on the paper and to the students and faculty from the University of Virginia who offered 
challenging critiques. I would also like to thank Dean Gerald Komgold for his continuing research 
support and Professors Ronald J. Coffey, Robert W. Gordon, Andrew P. Morriss, and Robert N. 
Strassfeld for their helpful insights. Errors remain mine alone. Stephan Schlegelmilch [J.D. 2000 
Case Western Reserve University] provided valuable research assistance. As always, I am eternally 
grateful to Eleanore Ettinger for her patience and enthusiasm in converting my handwriting to a 
finished manuscript and to my family members for their constant encouragement. 
1. Limiting enforcement to privately negotiated terms was consistent with the autonomy 
principle. For a discussion of the autonomy principle and its limitations, see Richard Craswell, 
Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489, 514-17 
(1989). 
2. As Clayton Gillette explains these transaction costs, "[t]he passage of time renders 
complete contracting both difficult and undesirable, for the costs of allocating risks deemed unlikely 
to materialize at all, or only in the distant future, tend to exceed the current value of expected losses 
from the remote event." Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Relationships and the Selection of Default 
Rules for Remote Risks, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 535, 535 (1990); see also Benjamin Klein, Contracting 
Costs and Residual Claims: The Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 367 
(1983) (detailing barriers to fully contingent contracts); James M. Malcomson, Contracts, Hold-Up, 
and Labor Markets, 35 J. ECON. LIT. 1916, 1917 (1997) (explaining that contracts are likely to "be 
incomplete in the sense that [the contract] cannot be conditioned on all the events that affect the 
payoffs to the parties" because of transaction costs and verifiability problems). Sometimes the 
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doctrines filling in incomplete contracts take the form of immutable or 
mandatory law-supplied rules;3 others exist as default rules that supply a term 
unless the parties opt out of the rule.4 Because courts (and legislatures) have 
assumed the role of implying terms,5 the critical question of justification for 
such terms arises: when and why should the law supply a term or a liability 
rule6 that the parties have not expressly agreed to? 
decision to leave gaps in the contract will be a rational one on the assumption that the likelihood of 
the event is remote. "Less rationally, the parties will leave out other contingencies that they simply 
do not anticipate." Oliver Hart & Bengt Holmstrom, The Theory of Contracts, in ADVANCES IN 
ECONOMIC THEORY 71, 132 (Truman F. Bewley ed., 1987). 
There is another problem in addition to the transaction costs themselves. Even if the parties 
agree on specific contract language "they may be unable to do so in a way that a court can enforce 
their intentions because the necessary information cannot be documented in court." Malcomson, 
supra at 1917. 
3. Immutable rules are not variable by the parties. There are several reasons for the law to 
impose immutable rules that cannot be contracted out of, as Ayres and Gertner explain. "There is 
surprising consensus among academics ... on two normative bases for immutability. Put most 
simply, immutable rules are justifiable if society wants to protect (1) parties within the contract, or 
(2) parties outside the contract." Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete 
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 88 (1989). A prime example in 
the Uniform Commercial Code of an immutable rule, cited by Professors Ayres and Gertner, is the 
obligation of good faith. /d. at 87. But see GEORGE COHEN, IMPLIED TERMS AND 
INTERPRETATION IN CONTRACT LAW: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS APPROACH 6 (Univ. Va., 
Working Paper, Spring 1998) (on file with author) (suggesting good faith can also be rationalized as 
a default rule rather than a mandatory one). 
4. Default rules are rules which the parties can choose to ignore by adopting an alternative 
contract. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 3, at 87. Courts (and other legal decision-makers) become 
involved in supplying default rules when the parties fail to resolve a matter by express contract ex 
ante. Questions of the legitimacy of legal intervention in such cases and the appropriate framework 
to use in supplying terms are examined in Jules L. Coleman et al., A Bargaining Theory Approach 
to Default Provisions and Disclosure Rules in Contract lAw, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 639 
(1989); see also Ian Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring of Contractual Rules, 3 S. 
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1 (1993); Randy E. Barnett, Rational Bargaining Theory and Contract: 
Default Rules, Hypothetical Consent, the Duty to Disclose, and Fraud, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL'Y 783 (1992) (critiquing Jules Coleman's rational bargaining theory as a basis for choosing 
default rules and elevating importance of consent theory); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The 
Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract 
Tenns, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261 (1985) (examining the way in which the system of state-supplied 
terms interferes with contractual innovation); Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract 
Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 608 (1998) (examining problem of implication of a default rule 
creating a bias in favor of that default rule and examining methods to overcome such bias). 
5. This was a role that contracts judges had consistently avoided (at least consciously). 
Critics would argue that by limiting enforcement to contracts as written and by applying "a system 
of suprahistorical norms transcending time and space," legal decision-makers ignored the inevitable 
"social contingency of our thinking about the law." Robert W. Gordon, Historicism in Legal 
Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017, 1025, 1056 (1981). 
6. For a thoughtful treatment of the nature of property and liability rules, see Guido 
Caiabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of 
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
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This issue of justification for legal interventions taking the form of a law-
supplied term or liability rule is a critical one. "Contention over how 
lawmakers and their coadjutors-advocates and commentators-do (and 
should) formulate and explain rules is rarely off the boil and never at less 
than a rapid simmer. "7 The expansion of judicial interventions in incomplete 
contracts has prompted scholars to debate the very nature of the role which 
courts should play in private agreements. Some scholars have viewed the 
doctrinal developments and the expansion of default rules as a challenge to 
the fundamental notion that "[c]ontractual duties are self-imposed, "8 since by 
definition law-supplied default rules are "imposing" rules on the parties and 
thus constitute a potential infringement on private autonomy. 9 Others have 
portrayed the advent of these interventions as a reflection of an underlying 
(but seldom admitted to) truth: that courts have and will continue to function 
in ways that extend beyond the implementation of private agreements, 10 into 
a domain that polices the fairness and substance of transactions by external 
norms. 11 
This Article is primarily concerned with default rules which imply obligations, liability rules, in 
cases where none were bargained for expressly between the parties. Another type of implication 
that courts might engage in might relate to representational statements. The focus of this Article is 
on implied obligations, though the same analytical structure used to justify such implied obligations 
might be used to justify implied representational statements in the form of communicative torts. E-
mail from Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, to 
Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law (May 5, 
1997 16:36:50) (on file with author). 
7. Ronald J. Coffey, Methodological Perspective 1 (Feb. 4, 1992) (unpublished manuscript 
on file with author); see also COHEN, supra note 3, at 1 ("[W]hen courts imply, and should imply, 
terms to which the contracting parties have not explicitly agreed loom large in contract disputes and 
in the legal literature on contract law."). 
8. Coleman eta!., supra note 4, at 639. 
9. "The problem of justification is complicated by the fact that the parties are being held in 
contract to terms to which they did not explicitly agree." Jd. at 641. 
10. Even as early as the nineteenth century good faith and other public norms were being 
incorporated into the case law. Letter from Robert W. Gordon, Professor of Law, Yale University, 
to Juliet P. Kostritsk.y, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 1 (Nov. 10, 1999) (on 
file with author). 
11. For a discussion of communitarian and fairness norms, see David Chamy, Nonlegal 
Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 375, 386-89 (1990); see also P.S. 
ATYJYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 167-177 (1985) (discussing elements 
of "fair exchange"). The insertion of fairness norms has formed what Professor Scott categorizes 
as the second strategy for the contract interpretation of relational contracts. As he explains this 
method, the courts are directed to "fill in the 'right' result or the 'right relational' result by 
imposing an equitable adjustment that takes all of the relational and contextual factors into account 
as they appear at the time of adjudication." Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational 
Contract, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 847, 850 (2000) [hereinafter Scott, Formalism]; see also Richard E. 
Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments Under Long-Term Supply Contracts, 16 Nw. U. L. REv. 
369 (1981). 
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Other scholars have viewed these doctrinal instances of judicial 
interventions differently and as consistent with the notion of courts acting to 
facilitate private agreements. Using rational choice economic analysis12 they 
have justified various legal interventions in terms of the parties' projected 
intentions and overall efficiency. 13 To implement private intentions and 
promote efficiency, the law should adopt the rule that most parties would 
have wanted absent transaction costs. 14 This approach favors majoritarian 
default rules "by providing widely suitable preformulations, thus eliminating 
the cost (and the error) of negotiating every detail of the proposed 
agreement." 15 
Two recent analysts, Professors Ayres and Gertner, have diverged from 
an interventionist posture and argued that in some cases the promotion of 
efficiency dictates that the law should decline to supply a term. When 
incompleteness is due to strategic nondisclosure, 16 courts should diverge 
from what the parties would have wanted and instead adopt a "penalty 
default rule" 17 designed to force the disclosure of information. 
12. If we assume rationality, then it follows that, regardless of the risk attitudes of 
particular parties, the dominant strategy for contractual risk allocation is to 
maximize the expected value of the contract for both parties. Only by 
allocating risks in order to maximize the joint expected benefits from their 
contractual relationship can the parties hope to maximize their individual 
utility. Any deviation from joint maximization generates an inefficient and 
thus an unstable contract. 
Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 597, 602 (1990) [hereinafter Scott, Relational Theory]. 
13. The connection between efficient rules and consent is a complicated one that has 
generated significant controversy. Judge Posner had drawn a connection between efficiency and 
consent in default rules by arguing that "it would be rational for all plll-ties to consent to whatever 
rules were most efficient." Richard Craswell, Efficiency and Rational Bargaining in Contractual 
Settings, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 805, 805 (1992) (discussing Jules Coleman's critique of 
Posner's proposed connection between consent and efficiency as justifications for default rules). 
14. See Charles I. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward A General 
Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 971-72 (1983); see also Colemart et al., 
supra note 4, at 641 (describing this hypothetical bargain approach to contractual gaps as "the one 
the parties would have made had transaction costs not made their doing so irrational"). Absent such 
transaction costs, of course, the view would be that the legal rule would not matter since parties 
could bargain to an efficient outcome regardless of the initial legal rule. See R. H. Coase, The 
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J .L. & ECON. 1, 15-16 (1960). 
15. Scott, Relational Theory, supra note 12, at 607. The majoritarian default rule approach 
favors an "objective conception of rationality," and seeks to mimic "a risk allocation the majority 
of similarly situated rational actors would have devised were they to bargain costlessly over the 
question in advance." ld. 
16. Ayres and Gertner emphasize the importance of identifying the different causes for 
incompleteness for devising default rules. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 3, at 92-94 (identifying 
strategic reasons and transaction costs as alternative explanations for incompleteness in contracts). 
17. See id. at 95, 97. 
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This Article is written in the tradition of law and economics. It accepts 
the basic proposition that contract formation and default gap-filling rules 
should be crafted to achieve efficiency goals and thereby maximize social 
welfare gains. 18 It argues that by using economic analysis and by identifying 
the discrete elements of a methodology for legal intervention19 it may be 
possible to rationalize disparate pieces of Contracts and contract theories. 
Although such a principle will not provide a meta-theory for all of contract 
law, clarifying the efficiency methodology for law-supplied terms and 
liability default rules would help to determine whether, when and how the 
law should intervene in a wide variety of contexts. 20 
The failure to clarify such methodolog-y has adversely affected the 
analysis of whether, absent a bargain, a liability rule should be supplied by a 
court to govern precontractual negotiations and if so, under what 
circumstances and with what terms. 21 While current analyses of 
precontractual liability have benefited from a shift from a doctrinal to an 
instrumental, economic orientation, such analyses suffer from several flaws 
traceable to the failure to clarify the appropriate methodology for law-
supplied liability rules and thus fall short of their potential. These 
18. It recognizes that there are other plausible goals the law could choose to serve in crafting 
legal rules. I will not revisit the debate on the propriety of using efficiency analysis. For a 
discussion of criticisms of the selection of efficiency as the goal to be achieved by contract rules, 
see Richard Craswell, The Relational Move: Some Questions From Law and Economics, 3 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 91, 100 (1993). 
Of course, as Professor Coffey explains so trenchantly, "the choice of values to be pursued in a 
goal-driven system of rule justification is well nigh an ultimacy ... ; for 'rightness' or 'goodness' 
of value selection cannot be verified empirically." Coffey, supra note 7, at 5. 
19. See infra Part III. 
20. This Article's focus on justifying law-supplied rules differs from the formalist approach 
which has recently surfaced in the contracts literature. Formalism "resolutely declines to fill any 
gaps at all. Under this formalist approach, courts are instructed not to create ex ante defaults or 
undertake any ex post adjustments, but to enforce the (facially unambiguous) express terms of the 
contract literalistically .... " Scott, Formalism, supra note 11, at 851; see also Alan Schwartz, 
Incomplete Contracts, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 277 
(Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
This Article also diverges from the recent scholarship examining the efficacy of non-legal 
sanctions as a reason underlying the predilection of transactors to dispense with legally enforceable 
commitments. See generally Charny, supra note 11. This Article argues, using a comparative net 
benefit analysis, that a law-supplied rule would be justified only if it were a cheaper means of 
achieving social welfare benefits at less cost than private contract or other non-legal devices, 
including sanctions. This Article thus offers a way of rationalizing non-legal sanctions and law-
supplied rules in one explanatory theory. For an elegant description of explanatory theory, see 
Frank I. Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Economic Theory of Law, 62 MINN. L. REV. 
1015 (1978). 
21. For a comprehensive treatment of the topic of preliminary negotiations and the possible 
distinct sources of liability, see E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary 
Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217 (1987). 
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approaches fail to take sufficient account of the behavioral realities of 
preliminary bargaining, including precontractual uncertainty,22 and neglect 
the critical question of justification. 23 These analytical failures in tum lead to 
incomplete justifications for, erroneous applications of, and overly restrictive 
cost benefit analyses for precontractualliability rules. The failure to develop 
a comprehensive methodology for law-supplied liability rules and terms has 
obscured scholarly analysis of contract default rules in general. It has also 
hampered analysis of particular problems in contract law, such as the general 
contractor's reliance in bidding contexts, and interfered with rationalizing 
judicial approaches to incomplete contracts. 24 
This Article offers a comparative net benefit methodology for resolving 
omissions in incomplete contracts. 25 Such a methodology can assess the 
22. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
23. See infra Part IV.B.4. 
24. See itifra Part VI; see also Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An 
Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies 21 I. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1992). 
25. For an early treatment highlighting the importance of precontractual uncertainty and a 
comparative framework, see Juliet P. Kostritsky, Reshaping the Precontractual Liability Debate: 
Beyond Short RWt Economics, 58 U. PIIT. L. REV. 325, 370-85 (1997) [hereinafter Kostritsky, 
Short RWt Economics]. The use of a comparative framework is reflected in Professor Jason 
Johnston's recent treatment of the topic of preliminary negotiation. In his article, Johnston 
considers whether there is a need for a law-supplied liability rule in the "courtship" process of 
preliminary negotiation. Jason Scott Johnston, Communication and Courtship: Cheap Talk 
Economics and the Law of Contract Formation, 85 VA. L. REV. 385 (1999). He argues that in 
some instances there will be no need for legal liability (and that legal liability will be 
counterproductive) because the parties themselves will have a private incentive to engage in "cheap 
talk." !d. at 389. The parties will have a private incentive to truthfully and accurately engage in 
cheap talk about the probabilities of trade occurring because of the "parties' mutual interest in 
minimizing wasteful expense in investigating and negotiating when there is in fact no possibility of 
mutually beneficial trade." Id. at 390. In such cases Johnston argues that legal liability would be 
counterproductive because it would actually "deter the low-cost seller from informing buyers that it 
is low-cost." I d. at 416. In other instances, Johnston argues that legal liability may be warranted 
where the non-performing party has an incentive to be deceptive about the actual possibility of 
trade. In such cases, the non-performing party who wishes the performing party to invest reliance 
expenditures and to engage in performance to help the non-performing party decide whether a deal 
will be in the parties' interest, the "pretrade talk will not be informative, when one party (say the 
seller) will wish to encourage the buyer to continue in the courtship process even though the buyer 
would not continue if it were informed that the seller knows agreement is relatively unlikely." ld. 
at 491. 
While this Article agrees that a comparative framework assessing private and legal responses in 
terms of their behavioral effects is needed, Johnston's focus on the dissembling aspect and the non-
performing party's tendency to mislead the performing party about the chances for a trade diverts 
attention from the main issue: the potential for opportunistic exploitation of sunk costs to reduce one 
party's uncertainty. There may be no active intent to mislead the performing party about the 
chances for a trade since the non-performing party itself may be uncertain as to the chances for a 
trade. Nevertheless, the non-performing party solicits sunk costs to reduce the uncertainty for 
himself and thereby subjects the performing party to the hazard of opportunistic exploitation of sunk 
costs. Juliet P. Kostritsky, Bargaining with Uncertainty, Moral Hazard and Sunk Costs: A Default 
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efficiency of a law-supplied rule in the sense of achieving goals for parties at 
less cost than private solutions. Such methodology would improve the 
analysis of precontractual liability issues in the cases, rectify deficiencies in 
default rule approaches, and resolve subcontractor liability under the famous 
Drennan rule.26 Articulation of the theory would unify a variety of seemingly 
unrelated contract doctrines as diverse as Section 45 of the Second 
Restatement of Contracts, promissory estoppel, implied excuse, and fiduciary 
obligation. 
The Article takes an instrumental approach to contract formation and 
other doctrinal issues. It assumes that lawmakers (and parties themselves) 
are interested in maximizing social wealth. 27 Like all instrumental analyses, 
it assumes that contract law has a "regulatory role"28 to play in crafting legal 
rules. It therefore assumes that liability rules will influence future 
bargainers' "behavior in ways that will affect social welfare. "29 Assessing a 
rule's capacity for maximizing social wealth requires inquiry into whether 
adoption of such rule will hinder or advance that goal, given the way in 
which people with average behavioral characteristics will respond to the rule. 
To demonstrate the need for a unified instrumental framework for 
deciding gaps and implying liability rules, Part II of this Article will first 
describe the competing visions of the role of law in contract gap-filling. 
Although each vision has expanded the ways in which we think about 
contracts and has offered more realistic models of bargaining, each still fails 
to offer a unified framework for deciding how courts should decide 
Rule for Precontractual Negotiations, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 621, 629 (1993) [hereinafter Kostritsky, 
Moral Hazard]. This risk of opportunism or strategic behavior by contracting partners provides the 
focus of this Article. To counteract that opportunism, this Article suggests a law-supplied liabilitY 
rule, even when there is no active deception. The justification for that implied rule rests instead on 
a comparative net benefit approach assessing the costs and benefits of alternative strategies for 
controlling opportunism including a law-supplied liability rule and private mechanisms the parties 
could devise. 
26. Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958). The Drennan rule formulated by 
Justice Traynor implies a term of irrevocability in the subcontractor's offer once it is relied on by 
the general contractor in formulating the overall bid. Id. at 760. It is reflected in REsTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87 (1979). 
27. "Neoclassical economics maintains a maximizing orientation. That is unobjectionable, if 
all of the relevant costs are recognized." OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 
OF CAPITALISM 45 (1985) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS]. 
28. For a lucid explanation of the differences between instrumental analyses of legal rules and 
the "traditional dominance of the interpretive approach" geared to ascertaining "what inferences the 
parties are justified in making about each other's intentions," see Avery Katz, When Should An 
Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 
1249, 1250-52 (1996). 
29. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of 
Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1264 (1980). 
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incomplete contracts. Part III of the Article outlines the methodological 
framework for unifying judicial approaches to law-supplied terms or rules. 
The framework will incorporate a: (1) realistic model of human behavior; 
and (2) a comparative net benefit framework to assess law-supplied 
interventions. Part IV traces the origin of the unifying comparative net 
benefit method to new institutional economics. Part IV analyzes how the 
failure to advert to the problems of uncertainty (and other bargaining 
impediments) has impaired the development of a complete comparative cost 
structure outlined in this Article and hampered the analysis of precontractual 
liability. Commentators compound these problems by employing overly 
restrictive cost/benefit analyses which fail to provide promisees with the 
optimal incentives to rely. Current analyses of reliance ignore the important 
issues of the problem of opportunistic expropriation of reliance investments. 
Accounting for these issues and applying the suggested methodology to 
reliance issues would improve results. Part IV applies the theory to several 
prototypical reliance cases. Part V explores two frameworks for dealing 
with incomplete contracts: a hypothetical bargain and penalty default rules. 
Since both approaches lack a comparative cost framework, neither can fully 
justify a law-supplied liability rule or term. Part VI applies the unified 
comparative net benefit framework to determine whether and in what fashion 
the law should intervene to protect the general contractor's reliance on a 
subcontractor's offer and concludes that the protections of Drennan should 
be modified using the framework outlined here. Part VII uses the unified 
framework to rationalize a myriad of cases of law-supplied interventions in 
contract. The section will address Professor Alan Schwartz's theory for 
explaining judicial strategies of intervention in incomplete contracts. 30 Part 
VIII offers a final assessment of why a comparative net benefit framework 
matters and outlines its advantages. 
II. UNITY THROUGH CLASSICAL LmERAL THEORY FOLLOWED BY 
NEOCLASSICAL, RELATIONAL, FAIRNESS, AND ExTRACONTRACTUAL 
THEORIES 
The development of a well-articulated methodology for justifying legal 
interventions has not yet been fully realized. Because the classical nineteenth 
century contract writers disavowed any role for law-supplied liability rules or 
terms, that liberal theory of contracf1 hindered the development of a theory 
30. See supra note 24. 
31. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 14-17 (1974) (describing Willistonian 
and Holmsian Classical thought). 
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of legal intervention, insisting that parties choose their own terms. Various 
doctrines in contracts32 reinforced that non-interventionist stance, thus 
rendering questions about legal intervention unnecessary. The theory 
emphasized freedom from contract and abstract rules, as well as the 
"fundamental dichotomy ... between the individual and the community. "33 
Courts advanced an individualistic focus by narrowly limiting their role to 
the enforcement of voluntary, consensual obligations. 34 Consequently, they 
generally declined (at least consciously) to interfere with voluntary 
agreements or to supply tenns for the parties. 35 
That unified vision of contract law has disappeared (or seemed to) as at 
least some courts and scholars recognized the unrealistic nature of a model 
which assumed that all problems could be solved by the parties ex ante by 
express contract. Proponents of neoclassical36 and relational contract theory37 
recognized the inevitability of contractual gaps and the concomitant need for 
judicially supplied ruies to govern omissions. These newer theories of 
contract reflected greater realism in the vision of contracting relationships 
and an increased recognition of the impossibility of achieving the complete 
"presentiation"38 ideal of classical theory under which alJ possible problems 
were resolved ex ante by contract. 39 The neoclassical recognition of 
deficiencies in the original contract caused its proponents to accede that 
"courts had to interpret, fill gaps, and even impose precontractual and quasi-
contractual liability. "40 Neoclassicists also recognized that parties themselves 
32. These doctrines included requirements of certainty as a precondition for enforcement. 
See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS§ 3.27 (3d ed. 1999). For an interesting discussion of 
the common law certainty requirement as an example of a penalty default rule, see Ayres & 
Gertner, supra note 3, at 97. 
33. Jay M. Feinman, The Significance of Contract Theory, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1286 
(1990). 
34. Jay M. Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REv. 829, 831-32 
(1983). 
35. But as Robert Gordon notes, the classical theory of nineteenth century fonnalism may 
have been belied by the reality of the case law since "in the actual case law, there was plenty of 
estoppel, good faith and unconscionability even in the 1880s and 90s, the supposed high point of 
classical theory." Gordon, supra note 10. 
36. See Feinman, supra note 33, at 1285-89 (describing parameters of neoclassical contract 
theory). 
37. Ian Macneil championed the idea of relational contracts to demonstrate the complexity of 
and conflicts inherent in such relationships and to explore the limits on the cognitive abilities of the 
parties to "presentiate" and deal with all future .contingencies ex ante. See Ian R. Macneil, 
Contracts: Aqjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and 
Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REv. 854 (1978); see also Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. 
Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089 (1981). 
38. Macneil, supra note 37, at 863. 
39. Feinman, supra note 33, at 1287. 
40. /d. at 1287. 
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could solve some of the gaps by "[t]hird party assistance in resolving 
disputes and evaluating performance"41 in the form of arbitration. 
Despite the agreement on the need for courts to play a greater role in 
incomplete contracts, there was disagreement on the nature of that role. 
Some viewed the expanded role to reflect a view that courts should police 
contracts by applying substantive standards external to the parties' individual 
agreements. Some neoclassicists questioned the perceived paradigm of a 
fully contingent contract negotiated by two "atomistic individuals; "42 they 
tempered the autonomy and individualistic focus of classical contract law by 
embracing the application of "communal standards of responsibility to 
others. "43 
Other courts exercised this expanded role by embracing standards over 
rules44 and by engaging in particularized fact-based contextual inquiries. 45 
Courts demonstrated an increased willingness to fill in gaps in incomplete 
contracts, often rationalizing the intervention in terms of the parties' 
projected private intentions.46 
Relational visionaries like Professor Ian Macneil, who followed the 
Neoclassicists, continued to chip away at the perceived paradigm underlying 
liberal theory. They stressed the unreality of liberal theory's assumption that 
the archetypal contract relationship was a discrete one-shot spot sale when in 
actual fact, many contract relationships were complex, continuing, and 
interwoven. 47 Relationalists stressed the importance of that complex relation 
and directed the decision-maker to confront the inevitable need to make 
adjustments not by reference to the contract itself but by reference to the 
"entire relation" as a reference point for contract adjustments. 48 
41. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 27, at 70. 
42. See Robert W. Gordon, Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law, 15 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 195, 207 (1987). 
43. Feinman, supra note 33, at 1287-88. 
44. For an important treatment of this shift, see Richard E. Speidel, Restatement Second: 
Omitted Terms and Contract Method, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 785, 786 {1982). Professor Kaplow 
"offers an economic analysis of the extent to which legal commands should be promulgated as rules 
or standards." Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 
557 (1992). 
45. Speidel, supra note 44, at 789 ("Consequently, standards rather than rules were essential, 
for standards both permitted and required the particular dispute to be set in context.") 
46. The effort to rationalize interventions in terms of the parties' projected intentions took the 
form of courts formulating default rules that would be hypothetically preferred by the parties. 
Justifications for the default rule strategy rest on instrumental considerations. See Scott, 
Formalism, supra note 11, at 2-8 (explaining instrumental cost saving justification for default rules). 
47. Ian R. Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentiation, 60 VA. L. REV. 
589, 594 (1974). 
48. Macneil, supra note 37, at 890; see also WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 27, at 72. 
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While the neoclassical and relational approaches to contract law have 
advanced a more realistic model of bargaining than· the mythical completely 
contingent contract, they still lacked a framework to guide judges and other 
legal decision-makers confronting the great issue of contracts: when the law 
should intervene with a term or liability rule when the parties have failed to 
decide a matter by express private arrangement. The failure to offer such a 
detailed framework can be explained in part because of the neoclassical 
orientation to "techniques used by contract planners"49 themselves as a means 
of resolving gaps rather than to law-supplied interventions. Moreover, to the 
extent neoclassicists recognized a role for courts for gap-filling, directing 
decision-makers to use "policy analysis, empirical inquiry, and practical 
reason, "50 they failed to provide a detailed and close analysis of the 
justification for legal interventions. Relational visionaries (championed by 
Ian Macneil) centered one inward to the "relation" with its "minisociety with 
a vast array of norms. "51 Such relational theory thus suffered from a flaw 
similar to the neoclassicists: of failing to address precisely how decision-
makers should decide whether and how to fill gaps in incomplete contracts. 
While the reader of Macneil's work is directed to the organic nature of 
contractual relationships and advised to give less "deference" to the 
contrad2 and more deference to the relational norms, a framework for using 
relational concepts to resolve incomplete contracts remains undeveloped. 
Other visions of contract law have argued that fairness or distributional 
concerns are increasingly important in modem doctrines (such as 
unconscionability) and should guide contract gap-filling and interpretation.53 
Fairness theorists focus on bargaining impediments arising from a special 
deficiency of one of the parties which might justify judicial int~rference in 
the form of a refusal to enforce all or part of a contract. 54 
There are, however, several difficulties with the fairness vision as a 
means of guiding courts confronted with the need to fill in gaps. "[U]nless 
highly specified, [fairness] is amenable to widely variegated 
interpretations, "55 and therefore the concept remains a problematic 
foundation for rule justification. Because fairness is such an open-ended 
49. Macneil, supra note 37, at 865; see also WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 27, at 70. 
50. Feinman, supra note 33, at 1288. 
51. Macneil, supra note 37, at 901. 
52. ld. at 890; see also WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 27, at 72. 
53. E.g., Chamy, supra note 11, at 386 ("This communitarian approach purportedly 
accommodates a range of community interests rather than simply enforcing choices made by the 
contracting parties."). 
54. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302. 
55. Coffey, supra note 7, at 9. 
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term susceptible of many meanings, by itself, the vision provides no means 
of differentiating when supplying a liability rule or term will or will not 
advance fairness goals. Moreover, because it focuses on the (extreme) case 
where one party suffers from a particular, individualized impediment, it is 
difficult to abstract from that case a theory of how contracts cases involving 
omitted terms should be decided when parties are equal as to endowment and 
the barriers to complete contracts involve informational or structural 
problems including: asymmetric information, sunk costs, and bounded 
rationality which are likely to recur over many transactions and affect all 
bargainers. 
Moreover, because there are conflicting visions of fairness, 56 it is difficult 
to justify intervention in terms of facilitating a particular fairness goal. 57 As 
Professor Ronald Coffey explains "fairness . . . unless highly specified is 
amenable to widely variegated interpretations and therefore is not, in its 
undifferentiated form, susceptible of application in rule justifications. "58 
Finally, because the fairness vision contains an incomplete framework as to 
assumptions about behavioral reality, it is of limited usefulness in predicting 
whether parties will be able to achieve their goals by contract (or whether 
structural barriers will prevent that) or in predicting how parties subject to a 
rule will react to it. 
Another vision of contract, exemplified by the noncontractual theorists 
like Marc Galante~9 and Stewart Macaulay, 60 poses a different difficulty for 
courts filling incomplete contracts. By stressing the importance of private 
noncontractual arrangements, these theorists have called into question 
whether it is necessary at all for courts to fill incomplete contracts. They 
have explored private arra..11gements that exist as a palliative to the 
deficiencies inherent in law-supplied default rules. 61 
56. See Kostritsky, Moral Hazard, supra note 25, at 637. 
57. Of course, as Professor Gordon notes, "the fact that there's lots of disagreement [about 
fairness] has never stopped courts from policing for fairness." Gordon, supra note 10. 
58. Coffey, supra note 7, at 9. 
59. See Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Couns, Private Ordering and Indigenous 
Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFACIAL L. 1 (1981). 
60. See Stewart J. Macaulay, Eleganl Models, Empirical Pictures, and the Complexities of 
Contract, 11 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 507, 523-25 (1977). Stewart Macaulay's pioneering work on the 
role contract law played in the conduct of actual businessmen documented the surprising extent to 
which contract law was marginalized by businessmen. Stewart J. Macaulay, Non-Comractual 
Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55-69 (1963). 
61. Lisa Bernstein continued the work of the non-contractual theorists and has stressed the 
importance of these private arrangements in her studies of the diamond and cotton industries. She 
has shown how parties may prefer in some instances to opt out of the law-supplied default rules 
and substitute their own private arrangements. See generally Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the 
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This non-contractual vision challenges the premise of this Article: that it 
is important to develop a principle to unify contractual approaches to law-
supplied terms. By stressing the relative unimportance of formal contract 
law, noncontractualists suggest that unifying certain subjects within the 
boundaries of contract law may be an increasingly arcane exercise as the 
focus shifts to private extra-contractual arrangemenis. Ii may iherefore be 
difficult to unify a subject whose boundaries have exploded to include private 
law propounded by trade associations since "sophisticated transactors might 
allocate some aspecis of their transacting relationship ·to the legal realm and 
some to the extralegal realm. "62 However, there is a real and significant 
question that is still unanswered by the mere identification of the extra-
contractual arrangements: when should the law intervene to fill gaps when 
neither the formal nor extra-contractual arrangement resolves a matter. 
Despite limitations, each of these visions has expanded, in some way, the 
possibilities of rationalizing the role of courts in incomplete contracts. The 
fairness advocates63 have directed our attention to what to do when there is a 
particularized bargaining deficiency.64 The question of when the law should 
intervene in the cases where endowments are equal, but there are recurring 
informational problems of bounded rationality, opportunism and sunk costs, 
and a failure to contract expressly on all matters, remains unanswered. 
Neoclassical and Relational models have directed our attention to the 
importance of a more realistic paradigm than the impossible to achieve 
complete "presentiation" model of classical liberalism. Yet, the refinement 
of a more realistic view of the nature of the bargaining process does not, in 
itself, provide a framework to use in filling in contractual gaps. 
Galanter, Macaulay, and Bernstein have directed our attention to the 
reality that parties will sometimes opt out of the formal contract system and 
Legal System: Extra Legal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 
(1992). 
62. Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for 
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1765, 1770 (1996). 
63. See generally Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 
HARV. L. REv. 1685, 1777 (1976) (discussing the "element of real nobility" in using altruism in 
judging cases). 
64. Thus, this Article is not actually concerned with cognitive deficiencies of particular 
bargaining parties. It focuses instead on structural impediments such as bounded rationality, 
opportunism, and sunk costs which may affect all transactors. The importance of integrating such 
bargaining impediments into a framework justifying legal interventions cannot be underestimated. 
With an understanding of the structural recurrent impediments to bargaining, it becomes possible to 
explain why intervention in the form of a law-supplied rule or term with a particular content may be 
needed to promote efficiency. The legal decision-maker can reach that conclusion by comparing the 
costs of controlling contractual hazards by law-supplied rules and private devices in light of the 
structural impediments which exist. · 
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prefer private arrangements.65 Such theorists, focusing on the importance 
and nature of these arrangements, leave us with the question of when and 
why a court should intervene if such arrangements leave a matter unresolved. 
The question that remains unresolved with each of these competing 
visions of contracts is how should courts decide cases of gaps, omissions, 
and incomplete contracts, taking it as a given that contract law is concerned 
with the enforcement of private assent-based arrangements, between parties 
of average behavioral characteristics who share certain goals, including the 
maximization of joint surplus. The approach outlined here assumes that it is 
possible to identify improvement-producing solutions that increase social 
welfare between the parties in assent-originated (contractual) relationships. 
The prior failure in the academic literature to articulate a framework for 
identifying solutions that can improve social welfare in cases of omissions 
stems, in part, from a failure to accept increasing social welfare as the 
justification for legal intervention. Some neoclassicists have adopted a 
different strategy of pursuing equitable adjustments out of a concern for 
fairness and wealth distribution outcomes rather than the maximization of 
social welfare. 66 And among those, the new Formalists, 67 who have accepted 
the instrumental goals of efficiency, have nevertheless placed an increased 
emphasis on the difficulties68 courts may have in filling gaps, as in cases 
where there is "information that is either unobservable to one or both of the 
parties or unverifiable to the courts. "69 Formalists have, therefore, opted for 
an approach, "resolutely declin[ing] to fill any gaps at all. "70 
Ill. A UNIFIED FRAMEWORK FOR JUSTIFYING LAW-SUPPLIED 
INTERVENTIONS 
A. The Framework: A Comparative Net Benefit Approach 
To remedy the deficiencies in these competing visions, to unify disparate 
pieces of the Contracts course and to respond to recent criticisms of law-
supplied rules,71 this Article suggests a framework to resolve when law-
65. See supra note 62. 
66. Scott, Formalism, supra note 11, at 851. 
67. See, e.g., id.; Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract Theory in Context, 94 NW. U. L. 
REV. 737 (2000). 
68. Scott, Formalism, supra note 11, at 851. 
69. /d. at 863. 
70. /d. at 851. 
71. See generally id. (describing reluctance of new formalists to fill contractual gaps). 
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supplied interventions are needed and when private arrangements may 
suffice. The framework adopts a comparative net benefit approach to 
determine if legal intervention could achieve certain goals at less cost than 
private mechanisms. It accepts the traditional assumption of law and 
economics scholars that it is possible to use an instrumental framework to 
identify default rules that will achieve "ex ante efficiency. "72 Thus, it rejects 
the effort of a second strand of scholars to promote "ex post efficient 
result[s]"73 by imposing "fair" results. At the same time, although 
recognizing that there may be certain disadvantages of intervening, such as 
"heightened risks of misinterpretation, "74 and recognizing that there may be 
some instances where it would be imprudent for the court to intervene when 
doing so would have to be based on "information that is unobservable to one 
or both of the parties or unverifiable to the courts, "75 there are nevertheless 
instances where a court-supplied liability rule will lead to welfare 
improvements. 
The framework of intervention must begin with a study of contracting 
behavior built on recognition of how "contractual man" behaves.76 A 
primary characteristic is "bounded rationality," which limits contractual 
man's ability to foresee future contingencies. Contractual man also acts 
opportunistically, using "self-interest seeking with guile. "77 Asset specificity 
in transactions in which parties' investments are particularized and non-
salvageable is an important factor in positing a framework for intervention 
since it limits the parties' ability to solve inevitable disruptions in the 
contract by simply exiting to the market. 78 That bargaining model of the 
average behavioral characteristics of parties and transactions, together with a 
model of contracting parties' average goals, will help the legal decision-
maker determine whether barriers to the parties privately achieving their 
objectives through express contracts exist. The framework then considers 
whether the parties would be able to achieve their goals through other private 
non-contractual strategies. The model directs the decision-maker to ascertain 
whether law-supplied rules and/or terms or other private strategies the parties 
might employ to reach the parties' goal (such as the "mitigation of all forms 
72. ld. at 849. 
73. ld. at 850-51. 
74. ld. at 862. 
75. ld. at 863. 
76. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTIYUTIONS, supra note 27, at 43. 
77. ld. at 47. 
78. The absence of transaction-specific assets renders the need to craft mechanisms for 
controlling disruptions unnecessary since in such cases "discrete market contracting is efficacious." 
ld. at 31. 
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of contractual hazards"f9 given the barriers blocking private contractual 
solutions, would be more cost effective. 
An understanding of this model-borrowed from the new institutional 
economics-would go beyond the neoclassical and relational visions of 
contract outlined here by providing a more complete model of bargaining 
behavior that admits not only bounded rationality problems but also problems 
of strategizing and in some cases asset specificity. Most importantly, it 
suggests the usefulness of a comparative net benefit framework for assessing 
the efficiency of law-supplied rules or terms in a wide variety of cases. 
B. Applications 
The usefulness of a framework premised on a realistic model of 
behaviored reality and a comparative net benefit test can best be understood 
by focusing on principal/agent theory. 80 It provides an example of a law-
supplied obligation in the form of fiduciary obligation. 81 The importance of 
fiduciary obligation applicable to agents for determining law-supplied 
obligations in contract may, at first glance, be obscure. Yet, close analysis 
reveals a useful framework. 
First, principal/agent relationships involve parties who have had the 
opportunity to bargain for a variety of terms, but who have failed to choose 
or contract for a precise standard to govern the agent's behavior. Thus, the 
principal/agent context raises the precise question at issue in incomplete 
contracts contexts-namely when, if ever, should the law intervene with a 
law-supplied term not expressly negotiated. In the principal/agent context 
the law-supplied term is the fiduciary obligation which would impose a 
"performance obligation"82 on the agent. 
To resolve whether the law should Lmply such a performance obligation, 
the law then focuses on whether the parties would have a joint interest in 
controlling the agent's moral hazard problem in order to maximize joint 
gains. The hazard in the principal/agent relationship arises because of a 
19. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GoVERNANCE 5 (1996) [hereinafter 
WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS]. 
80. See generally David E. M. Sappington, Incentives in Principal Agent Relationships, 5 I. 
ECON. PERSP., Spring 1991, at 45 (examining the paradigm problem of the agent shirking and 
causing loss to the principal). 
81. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 I.L. & 
ECON. 425, 426 (1993) (suggesting that the "duty of loyalty is a response to the impossibility of 
writing contracts completely specifying the parties' obligations"). 
82. Ronald I. Coffey, Firm Opponunities: Property Right Assignments, Firm Detriment, and 
the Agent's Performance Obligation, 13 CAN.-U.S. L.I. 155, 155 n.3 (1988). 
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basic fact: the agent has a tendency to shirk and to promote her own interests 
over those of her principal. 83 It is in the parties' mutual interests to control 
such hazards because a failure to negotiate a safeguard to control the hazard 
will result in the terms of the agent's compensation being reduced to account 
for the inevitable shirking or cheating in which the agent will engage. An 
effective safeguard for control of the potential opportunism of the agent will, 
thus, be a "source of mutual gain. "84 
Having established the benefits of controlling agent shirking, the question 
for the legal decision-maker is why the parties did not privately negotiate a 
safeguard. Here the decision-maker confronts the reality of a variety of 
barriers that the parties confront, including the hidden action85 and 
information problems. First, the principal cannot actually observe the 
agent's actions. Second, the principal will have a hard time determining how 
much of a particular outcome is due to the agent's good or bad efforts or to 
extraneous causes. Third, since agents will face many possible decisions 
over time, even if there were no problems of hidden action and hidden 
information, 86 the unforeseeability of future events would make it difficult to 
draft a contract to govern the agent's conduct. The fmal question for the 
legal decision-maker becomes whether a law-supplied rule would actually 
control the propensity to shirk at lower cost than other private mechanisms 
including incentive schemes. If so, then "[w]e interject such an implied term 
(that is, the performance obligation) for justifications that lead us to conclude 
that some selected ultimate objective (goal, end, purpose, consequence) will 
be achieved at a higher level with the interjection (intervention) than without 
83. Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic 
Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1048 (1991) ("Once a consensual 
relationship in which the principal relinquishes control or management or her assets to the agent is 
formed, the resulting separation of ownership from control or management creates opportunities for 
the agent to appropriate the asset or some of its value."). 
84. WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS, supra note 79, at 60; see also Oliver E. Williamson, 
Kenneth Arrow and the New Institutional Economics, in ARROW AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE 
THEORY OF ECONOMIC POLICY 584, 592 (George R. Feiwel ed., 1987) (citing "real economic 
value" in friction reduction). 
85. "The most typical hidden action is the effort of the agent. Effort is a disutility to the 
agent, but it has a value to the principal in the sense that it increases the likelihood of a favorable 
outcome." Kenneth J. Arrow, The Ecmw17'Jcs of Agency, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE 
STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 37, 38 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985); see also 
Oliver Hart & Bengt Holmstrom, The Theory of Contracts, in ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC THEORY 
FIFrH WORLD CONGRESS 79-83 (Truman F. Bewley ed., 1987) (discussing model of hidden action 
in principal/agent theory). 
86. Arrow, supra note 85, at 39 ("In the hidden information problems, the agent has made 
some observation that the principal has not made."). 
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it all things . . . considered. "87 The law would then compare private 
strategies such as screening, bonding, and incentive alignment schemes to 
determine whether a law-supplied term or private device would be most cost-
effective. 
IV. UNIFIED THEORY AS AWAY TO REORIENT THE ANALYSIS OF 
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL RELIANCE ISSUES, INSTRUMENTAL ANALYSIS AND 
PROMISSORY EsTOPPEL: A SHIFT IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION WHICH STILL 
FALLS SHORT 
A. Derivation of Theory: An Extension of the New lllStitutional Economics 
The unified comparative net benefit framework used in explaining or 
rationalizing why the law might supply a fiduciary obligation should also 
guide courts for filling in gaps in contracts. This approach derives from the 
framework developed by the new institutional economics ("NIE") and 
Professor Oliver Williamson for assessing, on a comparative net benefit 
basis,88 the private governance structures developed by parties as means of 
minimizing such problems as opportunism and other forms of moral hazard. 
The relevance of the NIE bringing unity to the study of contracts and for 
resolving questions of law-supplied rules and terms may seem problematic. 
After all, new institutional economics, by its own terms, downplays the 
importance of legal rules. It elevates the importance of private orderings that 
exist apart from legal rules and may provide superior solutions to common 
problems. NIE rejects "legal centralism"-the idea that "disputes require 
'access' to a forum external to the original social setting of the dispute" 
where "[r]emedies will be provided as prescribed in some body of 
authoritative learning and dispensed by experts who operate under the 
auspices of the state"89-and redirects attention instead to "private 
ordering"90 and other private governance structures. While it is true that 
87. E-mail from Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law, to Kenneth B. Davis, Dean, University of Wisconsin Law School (May 2, 1996, 
02:42 EST) (on file with author). 
88. The comparative framework assessing public and private frameworks is perhaps traceable 
to Ronald Coase. As Williamson explains, "Ronald Coase's classic 1937 article expressly posed 
the issue of economic organization in comparative institutional terms." WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC 
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 27, at 3-4. 
89. Galanter, supra note 59, at 1; see also WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 27, at 20. 
90. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 27, at 21. 
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NIB focuses on the emergence of certain private governance structures, 
explaining them in terms of their superior ability to "effect economizing 
outcomes, "91 the comparative cost structure should be relevant to courts 
assessing their roles in incomplete contracting contexts. 
Application of a comparative cost structure developed by Williamson to 
the issue of justifying a law-supplied rule requires an understanding of the 
methodology of institutional economics. First, NIB requires a model of 
behavior. It starts with the confluence of behavioral characteristics of 
bounded rationality, sunk costs, and opportunism to explain why parties 
might have difficulty adopting express contracts to attenuate the central 
problem of opportunism. 92 
Using this orientation, Williamson then looks at and explains governance 
structures as an alternative device to contract that parties may employ to 
achieve "mitigation of hazards," thereby promoting "mutual gain. "93 In 
looking at how parties can increase joint gain from the control of contractual 
hazard, Williamson develops an important formula. This formula posits 
"that technology (k), contractual governance I safeguards (s) and price (p) 
are fully interactive and are determined simultaneously. "94 In this formula, 
technology refers to the level of transaction-specific assets. Thus, k > 0 
when transaction-specific investments are substantial. If a party has invested 
transaction-specific assets and there is no safeguard negotiated by the parties 
to prevent expropriation of such assets, the "breakeven" price will be 
higher ,95 presumably because the seller who has invested assets will price the 
transaction higher to reflect the greater risk associated with the absence of a 
safeguard. On the other hand, a transaction with safeguards to guard against 
expropriation will have a comparative cost advantage. 
Franchising illustrates the importance of how specific asset investments 
and negotiated safeguards may affect pricing. In a franchise, the franchisor 
takes a risk that the franchisee will engage in "quality debasement. "96 A 
McDonald's franchisee might substitute inferior meat and thus hurt the public 
perceptions of McDonald's meat quality. To counter such franchisee 
cheating, the franchisor requires short-term rentals and other devices that 
would cause the franchisee a capital loss from his specific investments. 
These transaction specific investments by the franchisee, in effect, act as a 
kind of negotiated safeguard. Were such safeguards not in place, 
91. WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS, supra note 79, at 5. 
92. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 27, at 64-67. 
93. WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS, supra note 79, at 60. 
94. /d. at 62. 
95. See id. 
96. See id. at 63-64. 
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presumably, the franchiSor would charge the franchisee a higher price for the 
franchise privilege to cover the cost of potential cheating. 
The cost advantage of transactions with safeguards designed to curtail 
opportunism has been used primarily to explain the prevalence of governance 
structures. 97 Those structures that best succeed in mitigating hazards by 
economizing on transaction costs, enjoy a comparative net benefit advantage 
and, therefore, prevail over others.98 Comparative cost concerns have been 
used to explain a variety of corporate arrangements such as vertical 
integration as a governing structure. 99 "A comparative institutional 
orientation was employed to assess when and for what reasons market 
procurement gives way to internal organization. "100 
This comparative cost approach to hazard mitigation should provide a 
useful structure for unifying judicial approaches to incomplete contracts. It 
would recognize that because of bounded rationality, contracts will 
necessarily be incomplete and that such contracts will therefore fail to 
expressly control opportunism and may therefore resort to other more cost-
effective private devices to effectuate control of hazard. The comparative 
cost approach also suggests, at least by implication, that in deciding what, if 
anything, the law should do when such contracts are incomplete, the relevant 
inquiry should assess the relative costs of private and law-supplied 
mechanisms to deal with and control contractual hazards as a way of 
maximizing joint gain. 101 
The courts and other legal decision-makers should use a comparative 
cost/benefit structure to decide whether legal intervention is cost-justified. 
That structure should examine: (1) the parties' objectives (such as 
maximization of surplus through control of hazards), (2) the parties' average 
behavioral characteristics, (3) structural impediments to parties expressly 
bargaining for control of hazards, (4) parties' private strategies which they 
might use (as an alternative to private contract) to control such hazards, and 
(5) the costs of a law-supplied rule or term and the costs of the private 
97. ld. at 14. 
98. ld. at 47. 
99. ld. at 67. 
100. ld. at 66. 
101. There is admittedly a major difference in the method suggested here from its prior use in 
the corporate context to explain on a comparative cost basis which bargained for structures or 
mechanisms have prevailed, as contractarians would do. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Takeover 
Defenses and the Corporate Contract, 78 GEO. L.I. 71, 79 (1989) ("[T]he most important 
implication of the contractual theory of the corporation is that, whatever the source or nature of 
individual terms, they should be enforced."). 
This Article seeks to use the comparative cost structure to suggest a means of identifying the 
appropriateness of law-supplied terms or liability rules. 
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alternatives. The law should intervene only if the law-supplied rule or term 
would be the least costly alternative means of attenuating a hazard and 
therefore result in transaction cost economies. 
B. Reorienting Reliance Theories 
1. The Shift to an Instrumental View of Reliance 
The parties' drive to develop cost effective structures for attenuating 
hazards, and subsequent drive to maximize gain in a contractual relationship, 
helps to explain why courts concerned with instrumental goals should use a 
similar structure in assessing the justification for law-supplied terms and 
liability rules. At least initially, the importance of developing such an 
instrumental efficiency assessment for justifying legal rules in contracts 
remained unrealized in many areas, including promissory estoppel. 102 
Recently commentators have embraced an instrumental efficiency analysis as 
a basis for assessing precontractual liability issues; however, such 
instrumental analyses still fall short as a basis for determining when legal 
intervention is justified. 
Traditional doctrinal analysis of section 90 of the Second Restatement of 
Contracts and preliminary negotiation utilized a "convention maintenance" 103 
perspective to analyze liability issues, an approach which remained 
outwardly indifferent to instrumental considerations. 
Under a "convention maintenance approach" the law protects reliance and 
imposes liability on the promisor if it regards the reliance as "reasonable." 
It measures reasonableness by prevailing conventions; "reliance is reasonable 
if it is customarily expected under the circumstances. " 104 The difficulty with 
such an approach is, of course, one of circularity: what is usual is in tum 
affected by what the legal rule is, and it may not be possible to identify 
conventions or expectations which exist apart from the legal rule. 105 
102. See Katz, supra note 28, at 1250 (describing neglect of the economic components of 
preliminary negotiation and seeking to remedy that neglect by examining "estoppel and related legal 
doctrines ... as economic regulations"); see also Johnston, supra note 25, at 388 (asserting "there 
has as yet been no attempt to analyze systematically the general economic incentives" in preliminary 
negotiation). 
103. Katz, supra note 28, at 1251. 
104. /d. at 1254. For that reason, as Katz explains, convention maintenance theory only 
"makes sense if [the] parties' expectations are largely independent of legal practices." I d. at 1251. 
105. If the conventions are affected by changes in the law, then there is no particular reason to 
choose the prevailing convention as a source for the law; they "cannot tell us which legal rule is 
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Recent scholars of Section 90 have helpfully used an instrumental, 
economic analysis to assess the merits of precontractual liability. 106 The 
instrumental, economic analysis of promissory estoppel differs markedly 
from "conventional" approaches; it takes a "regulatory" perspective. 107 
"[T]he direction of the analysis is top-down rather than bottom-up. The 
central question is not which legal rule is consistent with the parties 
expectations, "108 but rather which legal rule, if any, ought to be adopted to 
promote "efficient reliance. "109 Under that approach "expenditures should 
be made based on the actual probability of agreement." 110 The promissory 
estoppel issue becomes one of deciding at what point liability should attach to 
maximize social wealth and to assess the rules in light of how "advance 
planning increases the gains from trade by allowing the parties to rely." 111 
The shift to instrumental analysis marks a significant development in 
promissory estoppel analysis. It encourages legal decision-makers to 
determine if intervention in the form of a promissory estoppel liability rule 
will advance or promote certain ultimate goals, such as the maximization of 
wealth and the promotion of efficiency. 
However, despite the general agreement on the overall benefits of an 
instrumental, efficiency analysis for assessing whether the law should 
intervene with a liability rule, its application to the particular context of 
precontractual liability suffers from several flaws that prevent the theory 
from fully justifying whether a liability rule is optimal. These flaws are 
traceable to the failure to advert to all of the elements of the justificative 
framework discussed earlier. For example, instrumental analyses of 
promissory estoppel have neglected the key role reliance plays in reducing 
precontractual uncertainty. 112 This neglect has resulted in overly narrow 
best." ld.; see also Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 269, 
275 (1986) (detailing the circularity problem in tests based on reasonableness of reliance). 
106. E.g., Richard Craswell, offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REv. 
481 (1996); Johnston, supra note 25; Katz, supra note 28; Kostritsky, Shon Run Economics, supra 
note 25; J. P. Kostritsky, "Why Inferr What the New Institutional Economics Has to Say About 
Law-Supplied Rules, 73 TUL. L. REV. 497 (1998) [hereinafter Kostritsky, Why Infer'!]. Earlier 
instrumental analyses of reliance include Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond 
Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake, n 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 903 
(1985); Goetz & Scott, supra note 29; G. Richard Shell, Opportunism and Trust in tile Negotiation 
of Commercial Contracts: Toward a New Cause of Action, 44 VAND. L. REv. 221 (1991). 
107. Katz, supra note 28, at 1253-54. 
108. Id. at 1253. 
109. Craswell, supra note 106, at 491. 
110. Johnston, supra note 25, at 392. 
111. Katz, supra note 28, at 1267. 
112. Economists have identified the importance of decision-making under uncertainty. See, 
e.g., JACK HIRSHLEIFER & JOHN G. RILEY, THE ANAL YTJCS OF UNCERTAINTY AND INFORMATION 
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efficiency assessments of reliance that judge efficiency solely by comparing 
the gain from the investment if the trade succeeds with the possible loss if it 
fails. Such an efficiency analysis neglects the separate and significant value 
the reliance may have in reducing uncertainty for the nonrelying party. This 
value is not captured by the loss/gain formula, which looks only at the 
relying party's loss and gain. 113 Even recent commentators like Johnston, 
who recognize the uncertainty problem, misconstrue the central problem to 
be one of dissembling, and discouraging overly optimistic talk "by actual 
pessimists who might otherwise prefer to pretend to be optimistic." 114 
Finally, some efficiency analysis of promissory estoppel has obscured the 
problem of opportunism, which besets precontractual bargainers who have 
invested sunk-~osts. 115 A failure to grasp that central problem has resulted in 
a failure to compare private strategies with the law-supplied rule as an 
alternative means of mitigating the hazard and thereby obfuscating the 
justification question. Without an understanding of the moral hazard 
problem endemic to precontractual negotiation, and the central problem of 
opportunism posed by the promisee's reliance on sunk costs, the law cannot 
begin to craft a rule to optimally mitigate that hazard. 116 
The law needs to look at the dynamics of precontractual bargaining in an 
entirely different way and to focus on a cost/benefit analyses of law-supplied 
(1992). For a discussion of the neglect of this concept in the context of promissory estoppel see 
generally Johnston, supra note 25, and Kostritsky, Short Run Economics, supra note 25. 
113. Johnston, supra note 25, at 392. 
114. /d. at 499. This characterization of promisors exploiting sunk costs invested by 
promisees ignores the possibility raised by Dean Robert Scott that after all the "promisee. has 
control over his reliance [and] can exit to find other promisors." Comments from Robert E. Scott, 
Dean, University of Virginia School of Law, to Juliet Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western 
Reserve University Law School 1 (Feb. 23, 2000) (on file with author) (commenting on 
presentation at the University of Virginia Student Colloquium on Contracts and Commercial Law) 
[hereinafter Scott, Comments]. 
In many of these cases, it is precisely the presence of reliance investments that makes an exit by 
the promisee an impracticable solution. Unlike situations in which asset investments are "general 
purpose investments" where difficulties "can be solved ... by each party going his way," asset 
specific investments pose the special problem of "strategic hazards that arise as a consequence of 
their nonsalvageable character." WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS supra note 27, at 54. 
115. See infra note 170. 
116. Exploring the implications of the opportunistic exploitation of sunk costs has proved 
useful in analyzing liability issues and contract doctrines. See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC 
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 27, at 30-31 (exploring the difficulties inherent in controlling for 
opportunism where bounded rationality and sunk costs are present); George M. Cohen, The 
Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff in Contract Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 941, 958 (1992) (arguing 
"that opportunism does and should play a much broader role in understanding and developing 
contract doctrine from an economic perspective than the legal economists have so far recognized"); 
Kostritsky, Moral Hazard, supra note 25, at 651; Shell, supra note 106, at 221 (suggesting a new 
cause of action to guard against opportunism). . 
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rules and private approaches designed to encourage investments to reduce 
overall precontractual uncertainty, while at the same time curbing the moral 
hazards associated with the exploitation of those investments. 117 Finally, the 
analyses should directly confront the methodological issue of whether legal 
intervention is justified.· 
2. Neglecting the Uncertainty Problem Leads to Overly Restrictive 
Cost/Benefit Analyses 
Neglect of the uncertainty in precontractual negotiation has caused 
commentators assessing efficient reliance to embrace an overly narrow 
cost/benefit analysis oriented exclusively to the ultimate transaction. 118 The 
embrace of such a cost/benefit analysis measuring possible losses and gains 
from. a reliance investment adversely impacts the analysis of promissory 
liability issues in several ways, as explored below. 
The tradition of judging the efficiency of reliance by a cost/benefit 
analysis of the reliance investment measured against the probability of the 
transaction being consummated derives from the groundbreaking work of 
Professor Charles Goetz and Dean Robert Scott. in their seminal 1980 
article, 119 they explain that every investment of reliance has a possible benefit 
of early investment, which may be valuable if the deal materializes, as well 
as a possible detriment if the reliance is lost because the deal fails. 120 To 
determine whether to invest, the promisee will weigh the "prospective gain" 
if the promisee relies early and adapts to the forthcoming promise 
("beneficial reliance"), 121 as well as the potential loss from the reliance 
investment ("detrimental reliance") should the trade fail, and the 
"probabilities of performance and nonperformance. "122 
In a recent article, Professor Craswell utilizes a similar cost/benefit 
analysis to measure the efficiency of reliance by looking at possible gains or 
losses in terms of the probabilities of an ultimate trade. 123 His suggested 
formula for judging efficient reliance illustrates the approach of judging the 
117. The control of hazard is a central recommendation presented in WILLIAMSON, 
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 27, at 63. 
118. See Johnston, supra note 25, at 391-92. 
119. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 29. 
120. ld. at 1286. 
121. ld. at 1267. Ideally, beneficial reliance will result as a consequence of a promise as 
"advance knowledge of a future transfer will increase the benefit to the promisee because he can 
more perfectly adapt his consumption decisions to the impending change in wealth." ld. 
122. Id. at 1270 n.26. 
123. Craswell, supra note 106, at 489-91, 501-07. 
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efficiency of reliance investments solely in terms of the ultimate 
transaction. 124 "Since reliance involves both potential losses and potential 
gains, the efficient level of reliance-that is, the level of reliance that will 
maximize the total expected value of the proposed transaction-can be 
defmed by the balance of potential gains and losses. " 125 Moreover, he 
asserts that it is "the efficiency of B[uyer]'s reliance [which] can provide a 
principled basis for justifying a court's application of ... contract formation 
doctrines. "126 Thus: 
[T]he efficient level of reliance depends on (1) the potential upside 
from the reliance, or the amount by which the reliance will 
increase B[uyer]'s gains if S[eller] does perform; (2) the potential 
downside from the reliance, or the amount by which the reliance 
increases B[uyer]'s losses if S[eller] fails to perform; and (3) the 
probability of each of these two outcomes (i.e., the probability that 
S[eller] will or will not perform). 127 
Thus, Professors Goetz and Scott and Professor Craswell all utilize a 
cost/benefit analysis for calculating the efficiency of reliance, which is in 
some sense comparable to the "'Learned Hand' test for defming the efficient 
level of precautions in a negligence case. " 128 Presumably, the efficiency of 
reliance depends on a comparison of "potential gains and losses" from the 
reliance, with a probability being attached to the gain or loss based on the 
chances for a trade or no trade. 
Professor Katz uses a similar cost/benefit analysis in which he considers 
the "advantages of beneficial reliance and the disadvantages of detrimental 
reliance. " 129 Under Katz's approach, one weighs when it is optimal or 
efficient to rely by multiplying the potential lost reliance by the probability of 
breach and by multiplying the potential profits by a percentage repre.senting a 
discount for the possibility of no trade. 130 In this case, as in the Goetz and 
Scott, and Craswell approaches, the efficiency of reliance is measured by 
balancing the gain and loss by attaching a probability to achieving the gain or 
124. ld. at 491. 
125. ld. 
126. ld. at 507 (emphasis omitted). 
127. ld. at 491. 
128. ld.; see also Goetz & Scott, supra note 29, at 1275. 
129. Katz, supra note 28, at 1268. 
130. Thus, according to an example posited by Professor Katz, if the potential profits are 
$20,000, but there is only an 80% chance of a trade, the discounted profits are $16,000. ld. at 
1269. The lost reliance is calculated by multiplying the amount of the investment by the chance of 
breach. Ii If the investment is equal to $60,000, and the chance of breach is 20%, the discounted 
reliance would equal $12,000. ld. According to Katz, expected net profits in such a case would 
equal $4,000 ($16,000- $12,000). ld. 
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loss. Under the Katz scenario, the "optimal time" to invest occurs when the 
"expected net profits are highest .... " 131 Presumably, that point would 
occur when some of the uncertainty regarding the trade has been resolved by 
the passage of time, yet, the delay has not been so long as to make the 
reliance too costly because it was made at the last minute. 
These cost/benefit formulations have been accepted as a means of judging 
whether, on a net basis, a reliance investment is efficient. 132 Yet, they falter 
as a complete method for determining whether a law-supplied liability rule 
(making a promisor liable for another party's precontractual reliance) would 
be justifiable and promote efficiency. The basic deficiency in current 
cost/benefit analysis of reliance is that to the extent that the formulae judge 
the beneficial aspects of reliance exclusively by how much the reliance will 
"enhance the value of the relationship" 133 for the relying party from ultimate 
performance, they downplay the separate and important value of reliance in 
reducing the informational uncertainty. They neglect the role "reliance plays 
in reducing uncertainties for putative offerors. " 134 
That neglect of the uncertainty problem adversely affects the analysis of 
promissory liability issues. 135 Such formulae "fail to consider how the 
uncertainties affecting the party deciding to contract may be mitigated by 
early reliance . . . . " 136 The neglect of uncertainty, together with an 
efficiency calculus geared exclusively to a cost/benefit analysis based on 
probabilities of trade, mistakenly suggest that early investments of reliance 
would necessarily be inefficient because at an early point, the probability 
attached to consummation of the ultimate trade would be relatively low. 
131. ld. at 1270. 
132. A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 32 (1983). 
133. Johnston, supra note 25, at 392 (citation omitted). 
134 . Kostritsky, Short Run Economics, supra note 25, at 371-72. 
135. In a thoughtful comment, Dean Robert Scott queried whether in fact my comparative net 
benefit approach would really have any advantages over the current approaches to precontractual 
reliance liability. "Doesn't the comparative cost approach actually push in the opposite direction-
toward less legal liability, not more?" Scott, Comments, supra note 114, at 2. 
This Article argues that a comparative cost approach would lead to liability whenever the court 
deems a liability rule to be a more cost effective means of constraining opportunism in the 
precontractual negotiations occasioned by the promisee's sunk costs. Since the problem reoccurs in 
a variety of factual contexts whenever promisee investments have been solicited by the promisor as 
a means of reducing uncertainty for the promisor, courts may find that a generalized performance 
obligation and liability rule might, in fact, lead to liability in a broad number of cases. It would 
lead to more liability, presumably, than a rule that deemed most early reliance as inefficient because 
it was made at a time when the probabilities of consummation were low. Even early investments of 
precontractual reliance can present the potential for opportunistic behavior occasioned by a need by 
the promisor to gather more information from the promisee, thereby making liability appropriate in 
such cases. 
136. Kostritsky, Short Run Economics, supra note 25, at 371-72. 
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Moreover, the neglect of uncertainty causes analysts like Goetz and Scott to 
underestimate the need for precontractual promissory liability. As they 
explain, "if promises are unenforceable, the promisee has the correct 
incentives to protect himself to the optimal level against risks. Because the 
promisee bears all risks of breach . . . he will rely on a promise only to the 
extent that the prospective cost of the reliance is outweighed by prospective 
benefits." 137 
This projected scenario assumes that the promisee's reliance will be 
optimal when he or she weighs the costs and benefits, taking into account the 
probabilities of an ultimate trade. However, Goetz and Scott's confidence in 
the promisee's optimal self-protection with a non-enforcement rule may be 
unrealistic. Under a rule denying enforcement, the promisee may not have 
the correct incentives to rely and may under-invest where the reliance 
investment is useful in reducing promisor uncertainty but does not actually 
result in any beneficial reliance to the investing party, as explained below. 
The promisee weighs his beneficial reliance against possible loss from the 
investment. Katz's example illustrates this adaptive effect: "[B]uyers can 
increase the utility of their purchases by investing beforehand in 
complementary inputs such as specialized storage facilities, or in such 
services as training workers to use the goods. " 138 As Goetz and Scott explain, 
the dilemma is one of "intertemporal allocation" 139 in which the promisee 
must choose how soon to invest. There are risks and benefits to investing 
early when uncertainty is greatest, but there are also costs to waiting 
because, as Professor Katz explains, "[a]s time passes, the incremental cost 
of delay will begin to exceed the incremental benefits of waiting. " 140 
In many cases, however, this ideal picture of how investment decisions 
are made, which will result in optimal reliance, is inaccurate. The reliance 
investment· made by the promisee may not actually result in any beneficial 
reliance to him, and he may therefore lack the correct private incentive to 
137. Goetz & Scott, supra note 29, at 1279. In part, Goetz and Scott's confidence in a legal 
regime allocating the risk of precontractual reliance may depend on the law and economics view 
that "liability should be placed on the party who is best able to estimate and control the risk." 
Johnston, supra note 25, at 489. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A 
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970) (developing a law and economics approach to liability). 
One objection held by attorneys and economists to a liability rule is that by insulating the promisee 
from the risk inherent in the reliance investment, the promisee may be tempted to over-rely. This 
temptation is known as the moral hazard problem and "effectively puts each party at risk of 
becoming an insurer of the other party's cost of premature performance." Johnston, supra note 25, 
at 490. 
138. Katz, supra note 28, at 1267. 
139. Goetz & Scott, supra note 29, at 1267. 
140. Katz, supra note 28, at 1268. 
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invest. In some cases; if the promisee weighs these benefits and costs of 
investing early, taking into account the probabilities of ultimate 
consummation of trade . as well as the risks from too early an investment 
"when the level of uncertainty is high," as well as the "cost of delay," 
optimal investment will result. 141 In other cases, however, this may not be so 
where the reliance actually benefits not the promisee but the promisor by 
reducing the promisor's uncertainty. 142 In such cases the promisee will lack 
the proper incentives to rely optimally. He will be unlikely to invest at all 
because he will consider only the possible detrimental reliance since the 
benefit ("reduced promisor uncertainty") will actually be external to him and 
thus not accounted for in his calculations. Thus, a cost/benefit analysis, 
which measures efficiency only by reference to the probabilities of an 
ultimate trade, will potentially underestimate the need for, and efficiency of, 
promisee investment. 143 
141. Id. 
142. In his remarks to the University of Virginia Colloquium Dean Scott queried, "Aren't 
reductions in promisor uncertainty reflected in a higher probability of promise being performed and 
thus an increase in net beneficial reliance (i.e., aren't these feedback effects in the precontractual 
negotiations that are reflected in a net reliance focus?)." Scott, Comments, supra note 114, at 1. 
Dean Scott was asking whether it was really necessary to focus separately on the uncertainty 
problem in precontractual negotiations because of an assumption that the Goetz and Scott 
formulation already captures an element of promisor uncertainty. The argument is that in weighing 
the benefits from investing, the promisee will weigh the cost if the trade materializes and the loss if 
the trade fails. According to Scott, promisee investment that will result in a reduction of promisory 
uncertainty will necessarily be reflected in a "higher probability of the promise being performed." 
Id. at 1. Scott's argument is that promisees will, in fact, make correct decisions on reliance since a 
reliance investment that reduces promisor uncertainty will mean that the promise has a higher 
probability of being performed. ld. 
However, the reduction in promisor uncertainty may not, in fact, lead to a higher probability of 
the promise being performed. In fact, the information gleaned may lead to the deal failing quickly 
as the promisor learns some devastating information about the promisee. For that reason, the 
current formulations, by failing to highlight the importance of the reduction of uncertainty, may 
result in promisees weighing too heavily the cost associated with the deal failing since such 
promisees would not be taking into account the external benefit to the promisor from the reduction 
of uncertainty. 
143. The neglect of the uncertainty problem as well as a static view of how parties act in the 
face of uncertainty should affect the analysis of precontractual liability. Professor Katz, for 
example, explains that "[i]n the presence of uncertainty, parties faced with investment decisions 
generally find it profitable to take an intermediate position-that is, to hedge." Katz, supra note 
28, at 1270-71. 
In fact, a putative promisor faced with a decision about whether to commit, and on what terms 
to commit, often does something much more proactive to solve the uncertainty problem: such 
promisor actively solicits sunk costs from the promisee to reduce that uncertainty. Once those costs 
have been sunk by one party primarily to reduce the other party's (the promisor's) uncertainty, the 
prime issue in determining if the law should intervene with a term is not that of bargaining power, 
as Katz asserts, id. at 1273, but of the opportunities for the expropriation of the sunk costs of the 
investing party by the non-investing party. 
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Because a promisee, weighing the costs and benefits of making a reliance 
investment by calculating its gain and loss based on the probability of a 
trade, may ignore benefits to the promisor in the form of reduced 
uncertainty, this Article argues that the current orientation in the Katz, 
Craswell, and Goetz and Scott formulations for judging efficient reliance 
neglects an important externality144-the possible benefit to the promisor 
from the promisee taking certain steps or investing sunk costs. 145 This 
exclusion means that even if the investment would not be justifiable if the 
costs and benefits for the promisee alone were weighed, the investment might 
nevertheless be an important one for helping the promisor decide if trade is 
possible and if so on what terms. However, because that benefit is an 
externality, the promisee may fail to take the benefit into account as he or 
she weighs costs and benefits. 
The· neglect of the uncertainty problem also causes Goetz and Scott to 
misconstrue the consequences of enforcing nonbargained-for promises. They 
assume that enforcement may cause promisors to make fewer promises or to 
further qualify the promises that they do make to avoid liability. 146 They 
refer to these reactions by promisors as "precautionary adjustments. " 147 In 
this conceptualization, a promisor's primary goal would be to optimize the 
"volume of exposure to regret contingencies" 148 from enforcement of 
promises, and enforcement of nonbargained promises would merely prompt 
promisors to do everything possible to limit liability exposure. Goetz and 
Scott are convinced that "[a] rational promisor will pursue precautionary 
adjustments up to the point at which marginal precautionary costs are exactly 
balanced by marginal reductions in regret costs." 149 
Once the issue is framed as opportunistic behavior of appropriating the sunk costs of the other 
party, it becomes incumbent on the decision-maker to determine if the parties or the Jaw will 
control it more effectively. 
144. As Harold Demsetz explains: "[w]hat converts a harmful or beneficial effect into an 
externality is that the cost of bringing the effect to bear on the decisions of one or more of the 
interacting persons is too high to make it worthwhile . . . . " Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of 
Propeny Rights, 51 AM. ECON. REV., May 1967, at 347-48. 
145. Arguably, a payment by the promisor could solve this externality problem. See 
Comments from Clayton P. Gillette, Professor of Law, University of Virginia Law School, to Juliet 
Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University Law School 3 (Feb. 23, 2000) (on 
file with author) (commenting on presentation at the University of Virginia Student Colloquium on 
Contracts and Commercial Law). But see Kostritsky, Short Run Economics, supra note 25, at 367-
70 (detailing costs of such payments designed to take care of the externality problem). 
146. Goetz & Scott, supra note 29, at 1273-74. 
147. /d. at 1274. 
148. /d. at 1273, n.31. 
149. ld. at 1274. 
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The difficulty with this projected "precautionary adjustment" response to 
enforcement is that it would not solve, but rather hinder, solutions to the 
basic informational problem that promisors face: the need for promisees to 
invest in ways that will allow promisors to determine the terms of a possible 
trade. The making of precautionary adjustments by promisors would seem 
counterproductive a.1d would not encourage promisees to invest sunk costs. 
Finally, the cost/benefit analysis oriented toward gains and losses on the 
ultimate trade with its neglect of uncertainty also causes scholars to 
circumscribe liability too narrowly. Professor Craswell concludes, for 
example, that "if the probability of successful consummation is extremely 
low-the efficient level of reliance might be zero, so an enforceable 
commitment would be unnecessary." 150 By focusing on the probabilities of 
ultimate consummation of the transaction, one is led to conclude that 
"B[uyer] should rely whenever the potential benefits of reliance (weighted by 
the probability that S[eller] will in fact perform) exceed the potential losses 
from reliance (weighted by the probability that S[eller] will not perform). " 151 
However, even in cases where the probabilities of consummation are low 
(or at least uncertain}, the possible investment of reliance can be 
expropriated by an opportunistic putative promisor who will use the reliance 
investment to decide whether to proceed and, if so, on what terms. Since the 
possible expropriation is a contractual hazard, and both parties can be 
expected to want to reduce contractual hazards in order to increase mutual 
gain, 152 decisions on precontractual reliance issues must consider not merely 
how likely the deal is to be consummated, but also what, if anything, the law 
should do to control opportunistic expropriation of the sunk costs invested by 
promisees. The court should weigh the cost of private strategies and express 
contracts that the parties could use to effect control. 
Recognition of the central problem of precontractual uncertainty would 
make it possible to understand that rather than making precautionary 
adjustments to the "costs of promising" 153 as a way of lessening exposure to 
the possibility that the deal might tum out to be less desirable than expected 
(a "regret contingency"), 154 a promisor would instead solicit actions from a 
promisee to reduce the precontractual uncertainty. For that reason, it might 
make sense to focus, not on how liability might cause promisors to rein in 
their promises, but rather on whether a liability rule that fell short of 
enforcement of the ultimate promise could encourage promisees to invest 
150. Craswell, supra note 106, at 493. 
151. Id. at 491. 
152. See supra note 84. 
153. Goetz & Scott, supra note 29, at 1271. 
154. Id. at 1273. 
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enough to reduce a promisor's uncertainty. Calculations of whether the law 
should impose a liability rule to precontractual negotiations must not depend 
solely on traditional calculations of efficiency geared only to the probabilities 
of a trade. Traditional efficiency calculations will significantly underestimate 
the need for a liability rule. The comparative net benefit framework 
suggested here would provide a better framework for determining if a 
liability rule would solve problems parties want solved (such as the 
alleviation of opportunism) at less cost than other alternatives. The 
traditional efficiency calculations are static because they ignore the fact that 
reliance investments are often being made to reduce the other party's 
uncertainty and, once made, leave the investing party vulnerable to 
expropriation-a problem that must be controlled to maximize joint gain for 
the parties. 
3. Solicitations of Pretrade Reliance to Reduce Promisor 
Uncertainty: A Larger Problem than Dissembling 
Explicit neglect of the importance of precontractual uncertainty has been 
mitigated by some recent analyses. 155 However, even commentators such as 
Professor Jason Johnston, who explicitly recognize the problem of 
precontractual uncertainty, rationalize liability in terms of achieving the goal 
of "informative pretrade talk." 156 Johnston argues that a party soliciting sunk 
costs may pretend to be more optimistic about the chance for a trade in order 
to encourage the relying party to rely when, in fact, the soliciting party is 
actually a pessimist. 157 
Professor Johnston has made an important contribution in highlighting the 
importance of the uncertainty problem in his recent Virginia Law Review 
155. E.g., Johnston, supra note 25; Kostritsky, Shon Run Economics, supra note 25; 
Kostritsky, Why Infer?, supra note 106. 
156. Johnston, supra note 25, at 391. 
157. !d. at 499. Professor Johnston's approach of subjecting the non-performing party to 
liability if he fails to speak and to discourage the performing party from performing further is 
directed at "forc[ing] informative communication by actual pessimists." /d. In some ways, this 
approach can be rationalized and explained as a type of penalty default directed at forcing the 
revelation of communication that a party would prefer not to reveal, such as his actual degree of 
optimism or pessimism about the chances for a trade. For a general discussion of penalty defaults, 
see Ayres & Gertner, supra note 3. The liability rule operates indirectly to force the revelation of 
information about the actual state of mind of the non-performing party. Johnston prefers this 
approach to a legal rule which would impose liability "if and only if the literal content of the 
assurance-that agreement was quite likely-was concealing." Johnston, supra note 25, at 492-93. 
The difficulty in an approach which directly aims to deter concealing content is one of judicial 
capability. The courts will have difficulty "determin[ing] ex post whether a party's ex ante 
statement was true in this sense." /d. at 493. 
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article. 158 He recognizes the important role of reliance, whose "primary 
function is not to enhance the value of performance, but rather, to determine 
whether there will be a relationship at all, and if so, upon what terms. " 159 
His recent article explicitly highlights the unique importance of reliance in 
reducing uncertainties in precontractual negotiation. 160 
As Johnston explains, part of the "economic significance"161 of reliance 
lies in the fact that beginning perfonnance may, in fact, allow sellers to 
distinguish themselves to the buyer. Before performance, the "buyer may 
well view sellers as essentially indistinguishable until they somehow 
demonstrate the capacity to perform this particular job. "162 That unique 
ability of performance to distinguish sellers, as well as market conditions, 
such as "high seller response costs, "163 makes it likely, according to 
Johnston, that buyers will conceal their types and pretend to be optimistic 
buyers (low cost) who have a high probability of trading when in fact they 
are pessimistic buyers (high cost with a low probability of trade). 164 If the 
buyers do not conceal their types, it is unlikely that the sellers would engage 
in the partial performance that is so useful in distinguishing amongst sellers 
and reducing the buyers' uncertainties about the sellers. 165 
For this reason, Johnston suggests a liability rule to make a party liable if 
he remains silent after the performing party starts to engage in partial 
performance without telling the performing party to stop. 166 Johnston 
supports a liability rule since it will foster efficiency by smoking out 
pessimistic buyers and saddling them with large liability if they remain silent, 
pretending that they are low cost buyers with a high probability of trade 
when in fact that is not the case. The buyer will, in effect, be encouraged to 
reveal himself for what he is-a pessimistic high cost buyer whose 
probability of trading with the seller is low. Forcing the disclosure "by 
actual pessimists who might otherwise prefer to pretend to be optimistic . . . 
158. See Johnston, supra note 25. 
159. ld. at 392. 
160. "The provision of a complex, customized good or service therefore both makes partial 
performance the only effective means for the seller to reduce uncertainty about its cost .... H ld. 
at 494. 
161. ld. at 493. 
162. ld. at 494. 
163. ld. 
164. ld. at 408. 
165. "Because partial performance is so costly, it may be that no seller type, not even the most 
efficient and experienced, would begin to perform if it were infonned that the buyer was a relative 
pessimist. ... H ld. 
166. ld. at 498-500. 
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is apt to be the only workable approach to the problem of deterring 
concealing pretrade talk. "167 
Johnston's approach creates liability "triggered" by optimistic speech that 
caused pretrade performance. The notion is that because the "pessimistic 
high-cost seller has lower chance of ultimately trading, . . . and therefore 
faces higher expected liability when liability is determined solely by the 
buyer/receiver's response" 168 in the form of partial performance, the 
pessimistic seller will speak up to discourage buyers from further performing 
to avoid further liability. 
Approaching the uncertainty problem from the vantage point of 
discouraging dissembling, and forcing a revelation of one's true view of the 
probabilities of a deal occurring, misconceives how uncertainty is likely to 
affect the bargaining process. In the beginning of negotiations, a party 
attempting to decide the terms of the putative trade often does not know 
enough to enter into a bargain and desperately needs the other party to rely. 
Doing so will furnish the information to determine whether a trade is even 
desirable and if so what the terms should be. Johnston recognizes that need, 
but he argues that the party only becomes liable by remaining silent after a 
party has relied. 169 Thus, one can immunize oneself from liability simply by 
telling the other person to cease and desist from any further reliance. In that 
way Johnston is confident that the rule will flush out pessimists who have a 
low opinion of the probability of an ultimate trade. 
This Article argues that Johnston's focus on the dissembling problem 
unfortunately diverts analysis away from the real problem of sunk costs 
being solicited to reduce uncertainty for one party. The party who solicits 
the sunk costs from the other party in order to reduce uncertainty for himself 
should be liable on that ground alone, at least if one· is convinced that a 
liability rule will be the most cost-effective way of deterring opportunism and 
increasing joint gain. The chance for opportunism occurs because one party 
is sinking non-salvageable sunk costs, 170 which is true regardless of the state 
of mind of the putative offeror. Under that view, the state of mind of the 
soliciting party is not of great importance and the soliciting party should be 
liable for the initial sunk cost and should not be able to absolve himself of 
liability merely by saying "cease and desist and rely no further. "171 An 
167. Id. at 499. 
168. ld. at 492. 
169. ld. at 488. 
170. "Sunk costs are like spilt milk: They are past and irreversible outflows." RICHARD A. 
BREALEY & STEW ART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 95 (3d ed. 1988); see also 
WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 27, at 29-32. 
171. See supra note 166. 
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overemphasis on dissembling interferes with an understanding of the full 
dimensions of the uncertainty problem. Without that understanding, one 
cannot surmise why it would be important for the law to supply a liability 
rule for precontractual assurances designed to solicit reliance without regard 
to whether the party soliciting or encouraging the reliance investments was 
overstating the likelihood of a trade. 172 
Ultimately, Johnston seems most concerned with imposing liability to 
flush out pessimists who pretend there is a high chance for trade when in fact 
there is not. That approach fails to fully grasp that the problem is often not 
one of promisors misleading promisees, but instead, the general uncertainty 
problem afflicting all precontractual bargainers. An approach that 
encourages pessimistic promisors to be discouraging once the promisee has 
begun to perform in order to escape liability does not solve informational 
uncertainty problems for the vast majority of promisors who are still 
uncertain about a possible trade. The difficulty with Johnston's approach is 
that the non-performing party who solicits reliance investments is forced to 
decide whether he thinks there is a high or low probability of trade and to 
take steps to discourage performance by promisees to avoid liability. Yet, 
the very reason that the putative promisor solicited sunk costs or part 
172. Johnston's approach, which creates liability based on the pre-trade perfonnance by a 
promisee who has not been discouraged by the party sending a message, suggests that it is the 
failure to discourage further reliance investment that creates the liability. Johnston, supra note 25, 
at 488-89. Yet, the initial investment of reliance which was solicited by the party sending a 
message or assurance, was solicited to reduce the non-performing party's uncertainty. ld. at 392. 
The solicitation of the sunk cost to hedge should be actionable on that basis and the non-performing 
party should not be able to shield himself from liability simply by further discouraging such reliance 
investments. Cf id. at 488-89. The initial solicitation of the sunk costs creates the possibility of 
the expropriation of sunk costs. See Tom K. Lee & I.P.L. Png, The Role of Installment Payments 
in Co,ntractsfor Services, 21 RAND J. ECON. 83 (1990). Unless that potential for opportunism is 
curbed at the initial stages, the promisee ("the receiver of the message" in Johnston's terminology) 
may invest less or not at all or insist on costly safeguards that require individual negotiation. See 
Kostritsky, Moral Hazard, supra note 25, at 682-83. To reduce those costs and thereby increase 
joint gain, the potential for opportunism should be curbed. 
The advantage of grounding the precontractual liability rule in the opportunistic exploitation of 
sunk costs, rather than in the tendency to engage in deceptive talk, is that it helps to explain why the 
parties themselves would have an interest in curbing the potential for opportunistic exploitation of 
sunk costs: to increase joint gain by curbing a contractual hazard. It also helps to explain the 
willingness of courts in other contexts in which courts intervene in the fonn of an implied term or 
liability rule. Thus, in section 45 cases once part perfonnance begins, the offeror may not revoke 
an offer. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45 (1981). There is really no deception 
going on and Johnston's theory would therefore not be instructive about providing a theoretical 
basis for an implied tenn. In addition, the particular rule which he suggests for courtship-of 
discouraging further investment to escape liability-would not really help resolve the section 45 
cases. That the law implies a subsidiary promise not to revoke can be better explained in terms of 
the theory outlined here of implying a tenn or liability rule in cases where the presence of the sunk 
costs by the performing party gives the offeror the opportunity for exploiting sunk costs. 
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performance from the promisee was to reduce uncertainties about the 
performing party's type. If the promisor is unsure as to the probability of an 
ultimate trade, he or she will need further investments, but might discourage 
further investment to avoid liability. 
While this Article agrees on the important role sunk costs play in 
reducing uncertainty in the contract formation process, there is a broader 
basis for imposing liability than merely flushing out "pessimists, " and the 
law should recognize that basis for liability. Although there may be some 
percentage of buyers who are known pessimists and pretending to be 
optimistic in order to induce the sellers to separate themselves, in other cases 
buyers are neither pessimists nor optimists, but merely learners whose 
expectations about the probabilities of trade will be determined by what they 
learn from reliance investing promisees in the "courtship" process rather 
than fixed ex ante. In each case, regardless of whether the promisor is an 
actual pessimist or not, he or she is using the sunk costs invested by the 
promisee to reduce uncertainty. 
The buyer has a high amount of uncertainty regarding the possible value 
of the object that he will be buying. A primary means of reducing 
uncertainty is by having the seller engage in certain performance steps. That 
then raises the potential for the buyer to exploit the sunk costs and use them 
to decide whether to deal, what value to offer, and what the terms of trade 
will be-a type of hedge. 173 In such cases, there may be no "actual 
pessimists," only those seeking to learn more about the other party. When 
the issue is framed in that way, the inquiry then becomes how to develop a 
framework to guide the law in dealing with the opportunities for exploitation 
by one party who solicits sunk costs from the other party to reduce its. own 
uncertainty. 
4. Obscuring the Framework Justifying Legal Intervention 
Another failing in current promissory estoppel scholarship-which is 
related to the neglect of the uncertainty problem and the use of cost/benefit 
analyses oriented to trade probabilities-is the obscuring of the legal 
intervention issue. A cost/benefit analysis that examines whether a party 
would calculate its own reliance investment to be an efficient one at a 
particular point in time, given the probability of ultimate agreement being 
173. This is different from the "hedge" discussed by Katz, supra note 28, at 1267. Katz 
contemplates a hedge by someone who is actually "making some transaction-specific investments." 
Id. This Article assumes that the party investing is not the party hedging-rather it is the non-
performing party who is hedging by soliciting sunk costs from the other party. 
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reached, does not fully resolve whether legal intervention is justified. The 
cost/benefit analysis used to analyze the issue of whether the law should 
intervene should be conceptualized differently. A suggested analysis to 
justify intervention follows. 
Justifying legal intervention in the form of a liability rule applicable to 
preliminary negotiation requires ·one to recognize the central moral hazard 
problem posed by the problem of opportunistic exploitation of sunk costs of 
the promisee. When the problem of precontractual reliance is conceptualized 
in that way, then the exclusive focus becomes "maximizing social wealth" 174 
by optimizing the "moment at which it is optimal to begin investing" 175 or 
becomes a weighing of prospective gain and loss from the reliance 
investment based on the relative probabilities of the trade or no trade. Either 
of these· means of identifying the efficient reliance represent incomplete 
approaches to maximizing gains from trade. 
It will not be possible to ascertain an efficient solution unless one also 
fmds a means of directly addressing the danger of opportunism and 
"minimizing the deadweight costs of transacting imposed by the natural 
barriers (uncertainty, opportunism, and sunk costs) as a means to increasing 
the gain from trade. "176 To determine how such deadweight loss should be 
minimized in preliminary negotiations, one should use the unifying 
comparative net benefit framework (outlined above) to assess whether a law-
supplied liability rule could control such hazard and thereby increase the gain 
from trade, given the natural barriers which do exist. It is incumbent on a 
legal decision-maker who recognizes that parties will try to control such 
opportunism in order to increase the parties' mutual gain to: (1) determine 
the possibility of private contracts to control such behavior; and (2) to 
compare the relative costs of other private strategies with law-supplied rules 
for controlling such hazards. Focusing exclusively on possible gain and loss 
will neglect the contractual hazard inherent in reliance investment as well as 
the structural impediments to express contractual controls. A failure to 
advert to a comparative cost/benefit analysis of efforts to control 
opportunistic hazards will interfere with a theory's "capacity to fully resolve 
the question of why a legal liability rule of an implied commitment is 
required" 177 and obscure the relevant analysis to use. 
174. Id. at 1268. 
175. Id. 
176. E-mail from Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University, to 
Juliet P. Kostritslcy, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University (July 16, 1996, 13:37:09 
EST) (on file with author). 
177. Kostritslcy, Short Run Economics, supra note 25, at 343 (emphasis added). 
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The traditional formula for cost/benefit analysis, which focuses 
exclusively on the potential gains and losses from investing a particular 
reliance sunk cost, not only interferes with an assessment of how gains from 
trade can be maximized by controlling contractual hazards, but also fosters 
confusion of another sort: confusion on the nature of default rules 
themselves. 178 By focusing on a cost/benefit analysis a party might use to 
calculate its own risks of investing, the traditional analyses of efficient 
reliance have obscured the methodological justification for legal intervention. 
An analysis of when reliance by one party is likely to be efficient (given the 
probability of trade) and of the fact that in such cases it might actually be in 
the other party's interest "to agree to such a commitment,"179 obscures the 
central question facing courts: namely when should the law, if ever, supply 
terms or liability rules when the parties have not. agreed ex ante to such 
commitments even when it might be in their mutual interests to have such a 
commitment. Moreover, by focusing on the mutual benefits to the parties 
from "advance commitment[s]," 180 the legal decisionmaker is discouraged 
from carefully assessing when legal intervention is needed to promote such 
mutual interests. Asserting that a rule would be in the parties' mutual 
interests does not explain why the law should intervene to advance such 
interests. 181 If the parties did not agree to what ·was arguably in their mutual 
interests, then what is the reason they failed to agree on such terms 
explicitly?182 Such an analysis must confront the importance of structural and 
informational barriers, including uncertainty, which interfere with the 
achievement of fully contingent contracts to control contractual hazards in 
order to develop a justificative framework for legal intervention. 
The failure to advert to the structure suggested here causes Professor Katz 
(who has helpfully directed us to the crafting of precontractual rules to 
promote economic efficiency), to avoid "address[ing] the interaction between 
default rules chosen by the state or private associations, on the one hand, and 
rules actually selected by individual contracting parties on the other." 183 Yet, 
178. See id. at 344. 
179. Craswell, supra note 106, at 495. 
180. /d. 
181. Jules Coleman and others highlight this problem as requiring "an account of why it is that 
something to which individuals would have agreed (though they did not in fact) provides a civil 
authority with grounds for imposing those conditions upon them now." Coleman et al., supra note 
4, at 645. 
182. Some commentators explain cases in which courts must decide whether to imply a tenn, 
such as in Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958), by reference to expressly 
negotiated option contracts, but the true justification for law-supplied tenns (as in an implied 
option) must lie elsewhere. See Craswell, supra note 106, at 498. 
183. Katz, supra note 28, at 1257. 
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that "formulation obscures the central issue[s]" 184 of legal intervention. The 
law must necessarily focus on such interactions because the court must 
examine the "rules actually selected" by the parties along with a 
determination of any structural barriers and must at the same time examine 
and compare state law-supplied default rules with other "private 
associations" and with other private strategies. An exa..mill..ation of the 
interactions is needed for a comparative cost analysis. 
Commentators approaching · the issue of precontractual liability to date 
thus fail to advert (at least expressly) to the legal intervention question. 
Recognition of the centrality of the legal intervention question would be 
beneficial. It would force legal decision-makers to develop a fra..mework for 
assessing whether legal intervention would improve efficiency. A 
comparative cost/benefit analysis should analyze: (1) the goals likely to be 
sought on average by the parties; (2) the barriers which interfere with the 
achievement; (3) the private devices or strategies parties could use to 
overcome barriers and achieve the goals as well as their costs; (4) the cost of 
a law-supplied rule; and (5) a comparison of the costs of a law-supplied rule 
with private strategies. Adverting to this structure would help to more fully 
justify rules of implied commitment in the precontractual context and in other 
doctrinal areas as well. 185 
C. Real World Scenarios: Or How Modified Promissory Estoppel Would 
Affect Analysis and Case Outcomes 
The advantage of an approach that makes the uncertainty problem 
primary, unlinks promissory estoppel protection from overly narrow 
cost/benefit analyses tied to the ultimate transaction probability, and 
highlights the methodology underlying legal intervention, is that it would 
actually render decisions in many promissory estoppel cases easier. 
Recently, some commentators examining a full range of promissory 
estoppel cases have begun to argue that courts are evincing a hostility to 
promissory estoppel liability. 186 In part these projections of promissory 
estoppel's demise in the case law are premature and stem from a failure to 
understand the importance of factors that help to determine whether courts 
184. Kostritsky, Short Run Ec01wmics, supra note 25, at 347. 
185. But see infra Part IV.D for a discussion of the critique based on possible judicial error 
costs. 
186. See, e.g., Sidney W. DeLong, The New Requirement of Enforcement Reliance in 
Commercial Promissory Estoppel: Section 90 as Catch-22, 1997 WIS. L. REv. 943, 949-50. See 
also Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the 'New Consensus' on Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical 
and Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 580, 588-96 (1998). 
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should supply a precontractual liability rule. An understanding of those 
factors suggests that when opportunism, sunk costs and bounded rationality 
are present and the promisor is using sunk costs from the promisee to solicit 
sunk costs to hedge and reduce uncertainty, a liability rule making the 
promisor responsible for the promisee's sunk costs should apply, at least 
where the court is convinced that private alternative strategies for reducing 
the opportunism would be more costly. An understanding of those factors 
suggests that, in those cases in which promissory estoppel claimants lose, 
those factors are not present; therefore, the claimants should lose. 
Conversely, when those factors are present, the success rate of promissory 
estoppel claimants is high. 187 
A class of cases which might benefit from a comparative net benefit 
approach involves cases in which promises or assurances are made and 
followed by one party investing sunk costs at the behest of the promisor. 188 
The promisee invests sunk costs and they are of such a nature that they 
reduce uncertainty for the putative promisor. The sunk costs help to 
determine if a deal with the promisee would be beneficial or not. In this 
class of cases the danger for the promisee is the same in each case: the 
potential opportunistic exploitation of the promisee's sunk costs to reduce 
uncertainty for the promisor. In such cases, the theory suggested here would 
posit that parties jointly would have an interest in reducing or controlling the 
moral hazard since a failure to do so would have caused the promisee to 
invest less or impose harsher terms. 189 The question then would become one 
of comparing costs and efficiency of a law-supplied liability rule to 
discourage opportunism with other private mechanisms, including a 
bargained-for contract a party might use to control hazard or other devices 
such as screening the promisor's trustworthiness ex ante, reputational 
controls, or option contracts. 
187. Juliet P. Kostritsky, The Rise and Fall of Promissory Estoppel or Is Promissory Estoppel 
Really as Insignificant as the Critics Say It Is (11129/00) (unpublished draft manuscript, on file with 
author). 
188. E.g., Cyberchron Corp. v. Calldata Sys. Dev., 47 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1995); Esquire Radio 
& Elec. Inc. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 804 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1986); Computer Sys. of Am., 
Inc. v. lliM Corp., 795 F.2d 1086 (1st Cir. 1986); Werner v. Xerox Corp., 732 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 
1984); V'Soske v. Barwick, 404 F.2d 495 (2nd Cir. 1968); OAO Corp. v. United States, 17 Ct. 
Cl. 91 (1989); Christensen v. Intelligent Sys. Master, Ltd., 399 S.E.2d 495 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990). 
189. See supra notes 93-94 (explaining that transactions without contractual safeguards will be 
priced less competitively than those with contractual safeguards). See also Lee & Png, supra note 
172, at 95 (explaining that installment payments may be implied in English law to encourage greater 
efforts on the part of contractors who would otherwise be subject to the problem of "moral hazard 
and in which there are large sunk costs"). 
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If one can conclude that a generalized law-supplied performance 
obligation requiring the promisor to disclose changes or a willingness to 
compensate the promisee for expenses was a more cost-effective means of 
encouraging promisee investment than other mechanisms including pricing 
and bargaining for each interim investment, and less expensive than 
screening promisors ex ante to assess their trustworthiness, then the law-
supplied rule should be adopted as the most efficient solution to a recurrent 
problem. 190 
Despite the theoretical appeal of a theory based on the comparative net 
benefit standard for curbing opportunism by promisors who use sunk costs 
invested by promisees to reduce their own uncertainties, the lurking question 
might be: Will the theory have any practical usefulness? The theory is useful 
because it helps to explain, better than the language of the promissory 
estoppel doctrine itself, the results in the cases. In those cases where the 
promisors have actively solicited sunk costs by the promisees and those sunk 
costs are useful in helping the promisor to hedge or to determine whether and 
on what terms to proceed with the transaction, the promisee will likely 
succeed in a promissory estoppel action. 
Certainly the Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, lnc. 191 case, one of the most 
famous in the contracts course, illustrates how the incremental investment of 
sunk costs by a potential franchisee helped the potential franchisor determine 
whether to grant the promisee a franchise. The potential franchisee took a 
number of steps including the acquisition and sale of a small grocery store at 
Red Owl's suggestion. 192 The franchisee's acquisition and operation of a 
small grocery store provided invaluable information in advance about his 
potential for success i.i1. a business enterprise, information that the franchisor 
would probably be unable to obtain in any other manner. 193 
Yet, if one were to apply the efficiency formulas conceived by Goetz and 
Scott for weighing the investment and its possible loss if the trade fails with 
the possible success if the enterprise succeeds by taking into account the 
relative probabilities of trade and no trade, Hoffman's investment in the 
small grocery store may well have been inefficient because the probabilities 
of a trade were too remote at that point. At the same time, the investment 
provided valuable information to the franchisor about Hoffman's ability to 
operate a small grocery store and thus had value in screening Hoffman's 
190. "[T]he one time state creation cost [of a state-supplied liability rule for precontractual 
liability] is less than the sum of the total costs private parties would otherwise have incurred to 
solve the problem for themselves." Schwartz, supra note 20, at 279. 
191. 133 N.W.2d 267, 268-71 (Wis. 1965). 
192. ld. at 269. 
193. ld. 
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capabilities. If putative promisors were able opportunistically to exploit the 
sunk costs of potential franchisees without legal liability, then the likely 
effect would be that promisees would invest less in future transactions and 
promisors would be deprived of valuable information that would enable them 
to determine whether to proceed and on what terms. 
The question for the legal decision-maker is whether the implication of a 
liability rule would mitigate the hazard of expropriating sunk costs in a less 
expensive manner than privately negotiated safeguards. As an alternative 
promisees could invest in screening potential promisors, in bargaining over 
each incremental act or sunk cost, or in negotiating bonding mechanisms 
designed to guard against opportunism. Yet, these private protective actions 
by promisees could be quite costly, at least when the costs of such devices 
are aggregated over many transactions. 
Since the problem of the opportunistic exploitation of sunk costs invested 
by a putative promisee to reduce uncertainty for a putative promisor is a 
recurring one, it seems that the situation is an ideal one for the implication of 
a law-supplied liability rule, since average parties would want to reduce the 
hazard in such situations in order to maximize joint gain by saving the parties 
from having to incur the costs of private protective safeguards. 
Other fact situations are similar to Hoffman in that the putative promisors 
faced with uncertainties made promises to induce promisee reliance and 
reduce uncertainty. 194 Those similarities in typology help to explain the 
success rate of the plaintiff. At the same time, in a large number of 
instances plaintiffs in promissory estoppel cases are likely to fail where the 
plaintiff's investment of sunk costs seems slight or nonexistent or the costs 
were invested before the promises were made or the promisee .is himself 
acting in bad faith. 195 In this latter group of cases, the danger of 
opportunistic exploitation by the promisor of promisee sunk costs to reduce 
his own uncertainty lessens, thereby obviating the need for a law-supplied 
liability rule. 
The famous (or perhaps famous only to the promissory estoppel 
aficionado) case, Esquire Radio & Electric Inc. v. Montgomery Ward & 
Co., 196 illustrates another case of a plaintiff victory which can be explained 
by the fact that the putative promisor was using the sunk costs of the plaintiff 
to hedge. In Esquire the defendant ordered goods from overseas vendors and 
paid for the goods but used the plaintiff as a middleman who would stockpile 
194. See supra note 188. 
195. Some of these factors and their correlation with failure rates in promissory estoppel cases 
are discussed in DeLong, supra note 186, at 997-99. 
196. 804 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1986). 
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the goods and make immediate payment for the goods on behalf of the 
defendant. When and if the defendant needed the goods, it would repurchase 
the goods from the plaintiff. 197 Only at the point of repurchase would the 
plaintiff actually recoup its costs. 198 The understanding between the parties 
was that the defendant would buy back all of the inventory so that the 
plaintiff did not get stuck with inventory for which it received no 
compensation. 199 At one point as inventories accumulated, the plaintiff 
became increasingly nervous and sought a formalization of the buy-back 
understanding.200 The defendant said "[y]ou ought to carry more and not be 
so tight on the quantities," and offered reassurance that it would buy back the 
inventory. 201 When the defendant reneged, the plaintiff sued and recovered 
on promissory estoppel grounds. 202 
The Esquire case is an easy case to understand if one grasps that the 
defendant was in effect soliciting sunk costs by the plaintiff to hedge its own 
bets. The defendant could not be sure of its ultimate needs for the goods and 
thus was unable or unwilling to commit to a fully contingent buy-back 
arrangement. 203 Yet, the informal buy-back arrangement allowed it to hedge 
and gain the full benefits of an available inventory when needed without 
shouldering any of the downside risk. The arrangement also allowed the 
defendant, for successive points in time, to hedge and to resolve the current 
need for the inventory to help determine whether a commitment of a formal 
enforceable buy-back arrangement would be justified. The accumulating 
inventories suggests that the defendant was learning that perhaps the demand 
for the products was not as great as anticipated and that such a buy-back 
arrangement would not be in its interest. Thus, the continued investment by 
the plaintiff in the inventory allowed the defendant to postpone the decision 
about whether to commit to a formal buy-back arrangement until the 
defendant had more information about the desirability of such an 
arrangement based on the demand for its products. The plaintiff's 
investment in the form of sunk costs of inventory purchases thus provided a 
valuable benefit to the defendant. 
The pattern of the defendant soliciting sunk costs to reduce his own 
uncertainty can help to explain a pattern in the employment cases such as the 
197. /d. at 791. 
198. /d. 
199. /d. at 792. 
200. /d. at 791-92. 
201. /d. at 792. 
202. /d. 
203. /d. at 794. 
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famous case of Grouse v. Group Health Plan. 204 In Grouse, an employer 
offered Grouse, a pharmacist, a job. 205 That job offer caused Grouse to 
terminate his current employment and to tum down another offer.206 
Subsequently, the potential employer indicated that a favorable job reference 
would be needed. 207 Because Grouse failed to deliver a reference, the 
employer hired someone else. 208 Grouse then brought an action and 
prevailed on promissory estoppeJ_2°9 
In many employment cases the potential employer discusses with a 
potential employee an undertaking that the employer might be willing to take 
in the future. Terms of the contract cannot be presently agreed to in part 
because of many uncertainties. The employer is often soliciting sunk costs 
by an employee in order to reduce risks or uncertainties connected with the 
hiring of a certain employee. In Grouse the employer was interested in the 
employee's termination from his prior job because that step was in some 
sense valuable to the defendant. 210 It increased the certainty that the potential 
employee would be ready and available to work for the defendant. The 
defendant was also uncertain about the employee's capabilities and was in 
some sense hedging to acquire further information about the employee, even 
after making an offer. 211 Because the plaintiff had taken some steps in 
reliance, by terminating his prior employment and turning down alternative 
employment, the defendant should pay for the reasonable value of whatever 
steps the putative employee has taken prior to the defendant's warning that 
his willingness to reach the expected agreement has changed. 
In employment cases in which promissory estoppel often succeeds, the 
putative defendant has sought certain initial steps from the putative 
employee. These often include the act of moving to the defendant's location. 
This action by the employee gives the defendant employer ·a further 
opportunity to reduce uncertainties about the employee.212 The very act of 
204. 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981). 
205. ld. at 115. 
206. ld. at 115-16. 
207. ld. 
208. /d. 
209. /d. at 116. 
210. ld. 
211. ld. 
212. Protection for beginning workers is consistent with Professor Schwab's view that such 
protection may be implied by courts through just cause terms designed to protect against "[t]he 
danger of employer opportunism [which] is greatest for late-career workers, and it is also a problem 
for some beginning career employees." Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating 
Just Cause and Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8, 11 (1993). But see Andrew P. Morriss, 
Bad Data, Bad Economics, and Bad Policy: Time to Fire WrongfUl Discharge Law, 74 TEX. L. 
REV· 1901, 1901-03 (1996) (suggesting rationale for retaining at-will rule since it "suits the 
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moving is a valuable signal of the employee's commitment. The employee's 
act of moving and starting work also helps to provide better information 
about the employee's worth than could be obtained in mere negotiations. 
That information is valuable to the employer in reducing the risks of hiring 
an unknown quantity. 
Because the information provided by the employee helps the employer to 
determine whether to proceed with a fully contingent employment contract 
and to screen the employee's capabilities, but at the same time leaves the 
employee vulnerable to opportunistic exploitation of his sunk costs, a liability 
rule is appropriate if other mechanisms ~for the employee to self-protect 
would be more costly. 
_D. Postscript to Case Law: Is the 'Methodology Practicable? 
Certainly one plausible response to the argument that courts should adopt 
the comparative net benefit methodology as a framework for deciding when 
courts should supply liability terms or rules is that the approach is too costly 
in terms of "the risk of judicial error. "213 Professor Clayton Gillette has 
argued that the methodology may be too difficult to implement given the 
disagreements that are possible over basic components of the test, such as the 
factor requiring an assessment of the parties' objectives. As Professor 
Gillette explains: "When contractual dispuJ_es arise in long-term contracts, it · 
is highly likely that the parties will disagfee, at least publicly, about their 
original intent. "214 
Yet, it is important to remember several things. First, the courts are 
aided in this process by the fact that "[t]here is also something taken to be 
more or less common and durable-again, without ruling out chronically 
gradual or episodically drastic shifts-in the behavior of individuals, acting 
· alone or collectively: what they seek, hflw they pursue objectives, and how 
they react to interventions. "215 Thus, the parties' objectives here are 
fundamental ones on which there is common agreement, such as, a desire to 
maximize welfare, rather than on the particular objectives the parties held in 
entering a specific contract. 
institutional competence of courts" and provides an appropriate "allocation of decisionmaking 
authority between the public and private sectors which serves the needs of both employers and 
employees"). 
213. Gillette, supra note 145, at 4. 
214. /d. 
215. Coffey, supra note 7, at 3. 
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Second, the liability rule is designed to cover a recurring situation in 
which the investment of sunk costs by a promisee at the behest of a promisor 
gives the promisor the potential to act opportunistically to exploit those sunk 
costs for the purpose of hedging,· The recurrent nature of that phenomenon 
seems to indicate that it would lend itself to the creation of a state supplied 
rule to control the hazard because it is a case where "the one time state 
creation cost is less than the sum of the total costs private parties would 
otherwise have incurred to solve the problem for themselves. "216 
Moreover, the development of an articulated methodology would help, 
rather than hinder, courts. While.. the methodology would require the court 
to make a number of determinations-assessing the barriers to contractual 
solutions, identifying behavioral characteristics of the parties, and comparing 
the relative costs of private contracts and other incentive schemes-the 
methodology is necessary if courts are ever going to be able to fully justify 
the adoption of a liability rule. Without it, courts specifying obligations are 
simply adopting rules without being able to fully justify them. Courts and 
legislatures in many contexts make determinations as to whether the adoption 
of a particular rule will help or achieve certain goals-whether it be the 
projected effects of an implied warranty of habitability, a liability rule for 
precontractual negotiation, or the implication of a subsidiary promise not to 
revoke an offer of a reward once performance has begun.217 In each case, 
these projected effects regarding intervention "as a means of achieving 
chosen goals can be verified to the extent that we can test the accuracy of 
assumptions about the workings of natural phenomena, both inanimate and 
living"218 and "assumptions take the form of hypotheses and of extensions 
therefrom reached through processes of necessary inference; "219 Thus, the 
fact that the framework could even be somewhat difficult to implement does 
not justify dispensing with it if adoption of such methodology would better 
promote goal achievement. 
216. Schwartz, supra note 20, at 279. The recurring nature of the problem of opportunism 
and the potential diminution in total gain that results from such behavior may help to mitigate a 
current objection to a judicial role in filling in incomplete contracts. This objection is voiced by 
critics who are urging a reduced role for courtS formulating terms or default rules for the parties 
and embracing a new formalism. They point out that in some instances courts are ill equipped to 
fill in terms where "any contract term selected by a court to fill the gap would have to be based 
upon information that is either unobservable to one or both of the parties or unverifiable to the 
courts." Scott, Formalism, supra note 11, at 863. In cases, however, where one parl'y 
opportunistically exploits sunk costs to reduce its own uncertainty, the implication of a law-supplied 
liability rule to control such behavior does not pose difficulties of hidden information or verifiability 
problems and, therefore, seems more amenable to a court-supplied term or rule. 
217. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45 (1979). 
218. Coffey, supra note 7, at 5. 
219. ld. at 6. 
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Moreover, the alternative to not adopting the structure or methodology 
might involve courts in continuing to impose or deny liability in 
precontractual negotiations without an adequate justification for doing so. 
Finally, since a major alternative to a court-supplied liability rule would 
be a negotiated option or side payment, the methodology of a law-supplied 
liability rule may be quite practicable in light of the cost of the alternative of 
requiring each party to negotiate such a side payment. 220 Requiring each 
promisor and promisee to reach private contractual solutions "ignores the 
real barriers that exist to subdividing performance into parcels that have 
equal economic value to each side to facilitate a trade at prices acceptable to 
both. "221 Thus; a law-supplied liability rule may well be the most cost-
effective solution to solving problems of opportunism. 
V. DEFAULT THEORY RECONSIDERED 
Although there is agreement on the need for default rules to govern when 
the "agreement of the parties does not resolve the dispute that has arisen"222 
and the "situation is a recurring one, "223 there has been a wide ranging 
debate about the appropriate method for legal decision-makers to use in 
selecting the governing default rules. In the earlier part of this Article, I 
suggested the adoption of a comparative net benefit framework. Some 
scholars have embraced a methodology which seeks to fill gaps using 
hypothetical bargaining as a justification for legal intervention. Others have 
embraced, as an alternative, a penalty default rule "purposefully set at what 
the parties would not want. "224 For different reasons (explored below), both 
methodologies fail to provide adequate justification for law-supplied 
intervention. 
A. Problems With Hypothetical Bargain Theory 
The traditional preferred methodology for filling in contractual gaps was 
the hypothetical bargain. 225 Hypothetical bargaining seeks to supply terms 
that the parties would have bargained for, had there been no transaction 
220. See, e.g., Wouter P.J. Wils, Who Should Bear the Costs of Failed Negotiations? A 
Functional Inquiry Into Precontractual Liability, 4 J. DES ECONOMISTES ET DES ETUDES 
HUMAINES 93 (1993). 
221. Kostritsky, Short Run Economics, supra note 25, at 368. 
222. FARNSWORTH, supra note 32, § 7.16, at 497. 
223. Id. at 501. 
224. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 3, at 91. 
225. ld. at 89-91. 
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costs. The theory was that by supplying such rules or terms, the legislature 
or court could save the parties the costs of contracting for terms preferred by· 
the majority. 226 Idiosyncratic parties could opt out of the rules. These 
fonnulations.of hypothetical bargain theory suffer from several shortcomings 
which impair their usefulness as a model for crafting default rules. First, 
hypothetical bargain theory assumes a frictionless world, and thus, cannot 
provide guidance for a world beset by frictions of opportunism, sunk costs, 
and bounded rationality. Because a second-best world of frictions does exist, 
it is important to assess default rules in terms of their ability "to solve the 
barriers problems that the parties would want, given a second-best world. "127 
By incorrectly focusing on lowering the "absolute magnitude of 
transaction costs "228 as an end in itself without a comparative assessment, 229 
hypothetical bargain methodology leads scholars to weigh only the "costs [of 
transacting] against the benefits of contractually addressing a particular 
contingency. "230 
In fact, in determining if intervention in the form of a law-supplied 
default rule is justified, the decision-maker must account for the reality of 
frictions, and assess not only the transaction costs of negotiating a specific 
provision, and the benefits from the provision (such as lowered opportunism, 
for example), but also alternative private incentives which might achieve the 
parties' goals and the costs of law-supplied rules as well as the relative costs 
of each. For that reason, the comparative net benefit approach is a more 
nuanced version of the majoritarian default rule. It also provides more 
specific content to the majoritarian default rule by expressly recognizing that 
judging the optimality of judge made rules and private arrangements requires 
reference to the fact that such interventions or arrangements take "place 
under the influence of such barriers (because the very meaning of a first-best 
world is the absence of such barriers)."231 
226. There is a contrary approach to default rules which seeks to supply tailored default geared 
to the particular parties. See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 2, at 541-46; see also Scott, Relational 
Theory, supra note 12, at 600-01 ("Each of these arguments for more particularized default rules is 
driven by the claim that individual attitudes . toward risk influence the nature of particular 
contractual relationships in systematic and predictable ways."). 
227. Kostritsky, Why Infer?, supra note 106, at 512 (quoting Coffey, supra note 176, at 2). 
228. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 27, at 22. 
229. "[I]t is the difference between rather than the absolute magnitude of transaction costs that 
matters." ld. 
230. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 3, at 93. 
231. E-mail from Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University, to 
Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University (April 5, 1997 22:44:54) 
(on file with author). 
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B. Rethinking Penalty Default Rules 
Shortcomings in hypothetical bargain theory led to an effort to develop 
an alternative structure for implied default rules lmown as "penalty default 
rule" methodology. 232 Yet, as seen below, because of Ayres and Gertner's 
focus on the aspect of the Hadley v. Baxendalr?3 case, which declined to 
supply a liability rule, the comparative cost structure which should be central 
to a court's determination of whether a law-supplied rule would be 
appropriate, gets obscured in their analysis. The penalty default rule 
approach was formulated by Professors Ayres and Gertner in one of the most 
influential articles in contracts scholarship.234 It argues that at least in some 
contexts. legal decision-makers should utilize "penalty defaults ... 
purposefully set at what the parties would not want-in order to encourage 
the parties to reveal information to each other or to third parties (especially 
the courts). "235 
Ayres and Gertner developed this theory of penalty defaults in a close 
analysis of the Hadley case.236 In a sense, the Hadley court was faced with a 
question of whether to intervene with a law-supplied term of consequential 
damages which was not agreed to expressly by the parties. In that sense, the 
case does involve a question of legal intervention. However, the Hadley case 
is a complex example of judicial intervention and non-intervention. Because 
of these complexities, it may be incorrect to use Hadley as a basis for 
justifying default rules which take the form of a law-supplied term or liability 
rule. Moreover, while the penalty default rule has the appealing quality of 
being able to offer "an apparently plausible rationale"237 for the particular 
result in the Hadley case, it cannot-by itself-form the basis for assessing 
whether a court should intervene with a law-supplied liability rule or term in 
other contexts. Such interventions must depend instead on the adoption of a 
comparative net benefit standard. That approach would "explain, with more 
robust explanatory power than the penalty default rule, a variety of other 
gap-filling default rules" in contract law.238 
To understand the limited usefulness of the Hadley rule as a paradigm for 
assessing whether legal intervention is justified, it is first necessary to parse 
the Hadley ruling. The Hadley ruling really has three components: (1) a 
law-supplied implied term of foreseeable (in the ordinary course) damages; 
232. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 3, at 87-91. 
233. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). 
234. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 3. 
235. See id. at 91. 
236. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). 
237. Kostritsky, Why Infer?, supra note 106, at 518. 
238. Id. at 527. 
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(2) a law-supplied term of implied consequential damages (if prior 
disclosure); and (3) a refusal to supply consequential damages (absent prior 
disclosure). 239 
In effect, the Hadley rule in its third (and most influential) aspect actually 
represented a refusal to intervene with an implied term of consequential 
damages. Thus, it is not a particularly good paradigm to use for judging 
generally the appropriateness and efficiency of law-supplied interventions 
which take the form of a law-supplied liability rule or term. 
If one focuses on the third prong of the Hadley ruling, which refused to 
imply consequential damages absent prior disclosure as to type, then Ayres 
and Gertner might argue that it is still a good paradigm to use in deciding 
default rules and that Hadley stands for a generalized framework to use in 
deciding whether to intervene. They might argue that whenever a party has 
strategically withheld information, it may be necessary for the court to refuse 
to intervene to punish that withholding of information and thereby encourage 
the parties to disclose the information in future contracts to increase 
efficiency. The normative argument is that efficiencies will be achieved if 
the parties disclose their true types, including their potential for damages. 
Such disclosure will permit the shipper in Hadley for example, to take cost-
effective precautions.240 Inefficiencies will result if one's true type is not 
disclosed because the shipper will not take cost-effective precautions. By 
penalizing the nondisclosure of one's true type, the Hadley rule will 
encourage the disclosure of information and thereby permit the shipper to 
take cost-effective precautions. Ayres and Gertner conclude that the penalty 
default rule will promote efficient separation of parties by type, and thus, 
efficiency, whenever the costs associated with contracting around the Hadley 
rule, the low damage default, are less than the inefficiencies associated with 
failing to contract around the default (what Ayres and Gertner term the "cost 
of pooling equilibria"). 241 "The efficient default minimizes the sum of these 
two costs . . . . "242 
Although Ayres and Gertner helpfully highlight "[t]he tension between 
'pooling' and 'separating'"243 and emphasize the need to compare the costs of 
separating against the costs associated with "the inefficiency cost when high-
239. Hadley, 156 Eng. Rep. at 151; see also Kostritsky, Why Infer?, supra note 106, at 518-
19. 
240. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 3, at 101 ("lnfonning the carrier creates value because if 
the carrier foresees the loss, he will be able to prevent it more efficiently."). 
241. Id. at 112. 
242. !d. at 114. 
243. Id. at 112. 
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damage mills fail to contract for greater precaution, "244 their formulation still 
begs the question of whether legal intervention is justified. It seems to 
suggest that the high cost millers will themselves "contract for the efficient 
amount of insurance"245 without confronting the question of whether, when 
and how the law should intervene when the parties' own actions fail to 
achieve the efficient result. 
The difficulty with the Ayres/Gertner approach, which focuses on the 
Hadley rule's refusal to intervene, is that it does not form an appropriate 
basis on which to justify a legal intervention. Ordinarily the central issue 
should be a comparative one: Would the suggested law-supplied liability rule 
or term maximize the gains from trade by reducing the losses from pooling 
(or not being able to separate) at less cost than the private strategies parties 
could employ to reduce pooling? The important point a legal decision-maker 
should consider is whether the suggested law-supplied liability rule or term 
will achieve the parties' goals (such as a reduction in loss due to 
opportunistic behavior) at comparatively less cost than private strategies. If 
one poses the question in that way, then it seems fairly obvious that the court 
should not adopt a non-Hadley rule which would grant consequential 
damages to all parties regardless of disclosure. Doing so would not achieve 
reductions in the losses from pooling because parties would all have an 
incentive to pool, and losses from pooling would remain. In other cases, 
however, the answer may not seem all that obvious, and focusing the 
question in comparative cost reduction terms may help the court to resolve 
the issue of intervention. 
By focusing on its "penalty" aspects designed to force disclosure of 
information, the Ayres/Gertner discussion of Hadley fails to focus on the 
comparative cost framework outlined above which should underlie any 
decision on legal intervention, and thus, fails to provide a framework for 
legal decision-makers to use in implying a variety of terms and liability rules: 
Without an understanding of these interventionist and 
noninterventionist aspects of the Hadley ruling [and without an 
understanding of that comparative cost framework], it becomes 
difficult to assess the importance of Hadley for resolving the 
critical question of when and why it is ever appropriate for the law 
to intervene with a term or liability rule if the parties have failed to 
negotiate one.246 
244. /d. at 109. 
245. /d. at 110. 
246. Kostritslcy, Why Infer?, supra note 106, at 519. 
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Even the second aspect of Hadley, which did represent a law-supplied 
term of consequential damages, was premised on the prior disclosure of 
special circumstances by the party with the information.247 Thus, the court's 
hypothetical willingness to intervene with an implied term of consequential 
damages was premised on the absence of opportunism. Thus, this second 
prong of Hadley is not an example of a court deciding to intervene with a 
law-supplied rule or term to control opportunistic behavior as the most cost 
effective means of controlling potential hazards and thereby maximizing 
mutual gain (as in the case of the court implying a fiduciary performance 
obligation to control agent shirking). 
The first prong of the Hadley rule, which was not the focus of the Ayres 
and Gertner discussion and which represents a willingness of the Hadley 
court to intervene with an implied ordinary and foreseeable damages term, is 
the one that actually yields the greatest insights into when a court should 
intervene with an implied term in order to minimize the losses from 
pooling-thereby maximizing the mutual gains from trade. 248 
The level of intervention in the first prong of Hadley, which implies 
consequentials for all ordinary and foreseeable losses, in effect, intervenes to 
give ordinary damages without disclosure. The result of this implied damage 
term, in effect, gives the lower cost miller the ability to identify itself as 
worthier (with less costly damages) than the others (who must opt out to get 
higher consequential damages)-it "permits them better to separate 
themselves than would private strategies"249 which, after all, are subject to a 
"budget constraint. "250 The rule, intervening to give all parties an implied 
term of all ordinary and foreseeable damages allows the party with _lower 
damages to separate himself out at a lower cost than would private 
constraints, and forces the high cost miller to undertake the costs of 
identifying his type to get the higher damages. 
Viewed in this way, the Hadley rule can even be viewed as a rule that 
may be preferred by both parties because it would: (1) permit the lower cost 
millers to be immediately identified as worthier (because they do not opt 
out); and (2) be preferred by the higher cost millers because the pooling that 
would allow the high cost millers to disguise themselves and that would 
otherwise occur under a non-Hadley rule actually would be "transitory at 
best, because the worthies keep dropping out. "251 
247. Hadley v. Baxendnle, 151 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (1854). 
248. See supra note 84. 
249. Coffey, supra note 176, at 2. 
250. ld. 
251. /d. Ayres and Gertner focus on the third prong of Hadley (no consequentials absent prior 
disclosure) and find that even if the rule would be efficient to penalize non-disclosure, it would not 
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What is obscured in the Ayres and Gertner discussion of the Hadley case 
is whether, in a case in which a court is faced with the prospect that parties 
will act opportunistically by non-disclosure of type, the court should actually 
intervene to control that opportunism with a liability rule or term when there 
are large structural barriers interfering with private contractual arrangements 
to control opportunism. Nom1ally a court should only intervene in such 
cases if it is convinced that the costs of doing so are less than the private 
strategies parties might employ to overcome the structural barriers. The 
Hadley rule emphasized by Ayres and Gertner actually involves that aspect 
of the case in which the court declined to intervene, and therefore, does not 
present a case involving the question of a justification for legal intervention. 
If, however, one focuses on the first aspect of Hadley, in which the court 
does_ intervene with implied damages to give damages that are ordinary and 
foreseeable, it may be because the legal decision-maker determined that the 
rule implying such ordinary damages would actually be preferred by low cost 
millers as one that would "achieve the greatest reductions in the loss from 
pooling and the greatest increase in joint gains from trade and net 
benefits. "252 The rule would even be preferred by high cost millers because 
the temporary nature of a pooling phenomenon under a non-Hadley rule 
would be short-lived. 
Thus, the aspect of Hadley representing an implied term of ordinary 
damages can actually be justified on a comparative net benefit basis. It will 
achieve the greatest reductions in the loss from pooling because it will be 
cheaper than other private devices the low cost millers could use to signal 
their worthiness (low cost damage status). The high cost miller would not 
object because the reductions in pooling loss would increase the joint gains 
from trade. If that comparative methodology is employed, to assess whether 
a particular law-supplied rule or term is justified, it might be advantageous in 
explaining a greater variety of contract default rules than the penalty default 
rule theory. 
To assess the relative advantages of the comparative benefit methodology 
and the penalty default rule in terms of their explanatory power for 
rationalizing disparate rules of contract law, it might be useful to examine the 
be preferred by the high cost millers who would prefer to remain anonymous. See Ayres & 
Gertner, supra note 3, at 101-04. As pointed out in the text, however, even high cost millers may 
regard themselves as no worse off under the Hadley rule since the non-Hadley rule under which 
they could earn rents from subsidized shipping prices would be "transitory." See Coffey, supra 
note 176, at 2. Morever, since millers themselves may be subject to strategic withholding of 
information by other contractual parties in the future, they may prefer the Hadley rule implying 
damages only if they are foreseeable or disclosed to minimize future losses from pooling. ld. 
252. Kostritsky, Why Infer?, supra note 106, at 526. 
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"zero-quantity" penalty default rule253 discussed by Ayres and Gertner. 
Ayres and Gertner assert that the "zero quantity" default "cannot be 
explained by, 'what the parties would have wanted' principle. "254 Instead, 
they see the default rule declining to supply a quantity where the parties have 
not done so as a perfect example of a penalty default. 255 They see the default 
as an effort by courts to force the party with the information about quantity 
to disclose it, since it may be cheaper for the parties to do so "than for the 
courts to determine after the fact what the parties would have wanted. "256 
However, if one looks more fully at a complete range of cases involving 
indefinite quantity, then the results are more variegated and hard to explain 
by the penalty default rule alone. There are certainly cases where courts 
refuse to intervene with a defmite quantity term, but there are also cases 
involving indefinite quantity in which courts do intervene by supplying a 
good faith term limiting the quantity that may be demanded (as in an output 
or supply contract).257 In such cases the penalty default rule alone does not 
explain the range of cases. If a desire to penalize parties for failing to 
disclose information were the principal concern, then courts should be 
inclined to deny relief in all cases which lack a quantity term, but that is not 
the case. A complete rationale must, therefore, lie elsewhere. 
The true rationale for such refusal, however, does not lie within 
the penalty default/information forcing rationale. The true reason 
for courts refusing the supply quantity, at least in one-shot spot 
trades is that there is no particular reason for courts to intervene 
. . . when there are no persuasive barriers to the parties reaching a 
fully contingent contract. 258 
Where the quantity is not specified, however, and structural impedinients 
(including bounded rationality) interfere with negotiating a quantity and there 
is the possibility of opportunism, the courts willingly imply a term of good 
faith by which to limit output and requirements, especially where the 
implication of such a good faith term may be useful in constraining 
opportunistic behavior. Thus, the motive of courts can perhaps best be 
explained, not in terms of a desire to penalize nondisclosure of information, 
as by a calculation that a court should decline to intervene unless the law-
supplied term would be the least costly alternative. In ordinary short-term 
253. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 3, at 95-97. 
254. /d. at 96. 
255. ld. at 96-97. 
256. ld. 
257. See U.C.C. § 2-306. 
258. Kostritsky, Why Infer?, supra note 106, at 529. 
1336 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
contracts where the parties face no insuperable obstacles to the specification 
of quantity but the parties decline to provide a quantity term, the court will 
decline to intervene because the costs of implying a quantity term are great 
due to the unverifiability of that information. 259 In other cases where the 
parties do face large obstacles (in terms of bounded rationality) to the 
specification of quantity in long term contracts, and the parties leave the 
quantity term indefinite but merely agree, for example, to purchase all one's 
"requirements," the court will readily intervene with an implied good faith 
term to limit a party's discretion. 260 That implied term will operate to 
enforce what would otherwise be an indefinite contract that might be 
unenforceable because of the illusory nature of the promise. This result can 
be explained in part by: (1) the courts' desire to curb opportunistic behavior 
by the party with the discretion over quantity, and (2) a determination that a 
law-supplied generalized commitment to curb such opportunism would be 
less costly than private contractual arrangements or other private 
strategies. 261 
VI. OTHER APPLICATIONS: SUBCONTRACTING 
In subcontracting cases, courts face the determination of whether to imply 
a term, but the issue is the universal one of determining whether legal 
interventions in the form of an implied term of irrevocability can be justified 
on a comparative cost basis. 262 Once the issue is framed in that manner, then 
it becomes incumbent on the legal decision-maker to analyze the 
impediments impeding an express contract or option, the objectives of the 
parties, the potential problem of opportunism due to sunk costs of one party, 
as well as possible solutions. 
In the context of subcontracting, general contractors rely on 
subcontractors' bids in computing their overall bids. Courts addressing this 
issue have liberally followed Drennan and implied a term of irrevocability 
for the subcontractor's offer once it has been relied upon. 263 The question in 
subcontracting cases is whether the circumstances merit the law intervening 
with an implied term of irrevocability for the subcontractor's offer. 
The subcontracting context is subject to bargaining constraints, which 
might interfere with the negotiation of an express contract which would fully 
259. See Schwartz, supra note 24, at 294. 
260. See U.C.C. § 2-306. 
261. Kostritsky, Why Infer?, supra note 106, at 541-53. 
262. /d. at 541-43. 
263. ld. at 542. 
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protect any reliance by either party. The general contractor cannot 
unconditionally promise to use the subcontractor because he does not !mow if 
he will be awarded the overall contract-a major uncertainty.264 The general 
contractor can only commit based on a probability distribution and such a 
limited commitment may be insufficient to compensate the subcontractor for 
an unconditional commitment. These uncertainties will interfere with the 
negotiation of a fully contingent contract. Yet, despite the absence of a 
bargain, the general contractor may need to rely on the subcontractor's 
figures and its offer. 265 The question for the law is: Should the law imply a 
generalized performance obligation to govern the subcontractor's behavior 
and protect the general contractor's reliance? The subcontractor might make 
a limited commitment to perform so long as intervening events create no 
additional burdens on her ability to perform. That conditional commitment 
might be sufficient to offset the general contractor's costs. 
"A default rule imposing such a conditional commitment on the general 
contractor to use the subcontractor [if awarded the overall bid] and a 
conditional commitment by the subcontractor to perform according to her bid 
(becoming unconditional if no intervening events cause additional burdens)" 
would represent a departure from current law.266 Drennan and section 87(2) 
make the subcontractor's offer irrevocable-an unconditional commitment-
and do not bind the general contractor to any conmlitment at all. 267 The rule 
proposed here "would satisfy the parties' rational expectations and would 
save them the costs of explicitly contracting over every change in the value 
of their respective positions prior to the point at which specification of a 
complete and explicit bargain is possible. "268 
VII. UNIFIED THEORY VISA VIS ALAN SCHWARTZ 
Perhaps the theory of a comparative net benefit methodology outlined 
here offers another advantage: tying together and explaining when courts will 
and when they will notintervene with implied terms or liability rules. 
Professor Alan Schwartz has offered a theory to explain and unify the 
variegated approach of courts to incomplete contracts. His theory is based 
264. ld. at 543. 
265. Comment, The Subcontractor's Bid: An Option Contract Arising Through Promissory 
Estoppel, 34 EMORY L.J. 421, 421 (1985) (discussing need for general contractor to rely by 
submitting its own overall bid). 
266. Kostritsk:y, Moral Hazard, supra note 25, at 692. 
267. Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS§ 87(2) (1981). 
268. Kostritsky, Moral Hazard, supra note 25, at 692. 
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on the notion that "courts would rather be passive than active when faced 
with problems that they cannot solve. "269 As one example, Schwartz 
addresses the excuse doctrine. If parties ask for court intervention in the 
form of an implied excuse, courts are likely to intervene only when the 
factors allegedly giving rise to an excuse are easily verifiable by courts. 270 
Schwartz argues that a court's willingness to intervene to fill gaps in 
contracts will depend largely on whether the court is capable of supplying a 
term. 271 Judicial capability, in tum, depends on whether the omission relates 
to a matter which is easily verifiable by a court. 
According to Schwartz, the courts will readily grant excuse in the case of 
"exogenous events [which] may affect a performing party's physical ability 
to perform" since "[t]he occurrence and effect of major exogenous events 
ordinarily is verifiable. "272 Where a party asks for excuse based on 
increased cost of performance, on the other hand, courts will deny relief 
because deciding that case would require courts to scrutinize the performer's 
costs, matters which are not easily verifiable by a court.273 Schwartz's 
verifiability theory has obvious appeal since it seems to explain the split 
between cases granting excuse (physical destruction, governmental 
regulation) and cases . denying relief (partial frustration) and, in addition, is 
simple to implement. 
The theory also makes sense in terms of the cost benefit theory discussed 
earlier because it suggests that courts will decline to intervene when doing so 
is too costly. Under the unified comparative net benefit framework theory, 
legal intervention ordinarily would not be justified unless the law-supplied 
rule would be a less costly alternative than private devices that the parties 
might employ to overcome structural barriers to private express contracts, 
and thereby, achieve shared goals such as curbing opportunism and 
maximizing surplus. That comparative cost theory might suggest a similar 
result of non-intervention in cases where information is unverifiable or not 
accessible to courts. In such cases, it would be hard to see how one would 
conclude that legal intervention would be cost-justified. 
269. Schwartz, supra note 24, at 274. In effect, Schwartz is addressing the judicial capability 
or monitoring problem. 
270. Id. at 290-94, 314. 
271. ld. at 298, 313. 
272. ld. at 286. "Examples include floods, fires, wars, embargoes, strikes and government 
regulations. The risk that such events will occur is contractible; asymmetric information helps 
explain how the risk is allocated. The occurrence and effect of major exogenous events ordinarily 
is verifiable .... " Id. 
273. ld. at 283, 292. 
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Yet, Schwartz's focus on the verifiability issue as the key factor that 
explains a court's willingness or unwillingness to intervene represents only a 
partial explanation for the court's behavior. A more complete explanation 
rationalizing court intervention should start with the goals the parties have set 
(such as maximization of surplus, recognizing that parties seek to control 
opportunism and other contractual hazards to achieve greater surplus). 
Then, one should take account of the serious obstacles parties face in 
controlling contractual hazards by express contract and examine thereafter 
whether private devices or strategies parties might employ to overcome such 
obstacles would be more or less costly than law-supplied rules or 
interventions. 274 
Although the verifiability issue certainly may be part of the cost/benefit 
calculus of legal intervention, the focus on the parties' goals, such as 
controlling for contractual hazards, together with a comparative net benefit 
approach, offers a broader rationale that could be used to better justify and 
explain legal intervention in a wider variety of cases. 
For example, in the indefinite quantity scenario with cases arising with 
output and requirements contracts, the court implies a term of good faith to 
constrain the behavior or party with discretion to produce output or declare 
requirements.275 In requirements contracts, the courts readily apply that 
standard to find opportunism when a buyer vastly increases its 
"requirements" to take advantage of a low fixed purchase price in a rising 
market to propel itself into the position as a wholesaler. 276 Schwartz explains 
that these cases turn on the fact that the court can easily verify whether there 
are "systemic factors [that] cause the market price to rise substantially above 
the contract price. "217 Other matters similarly involve verifiable_ issues. If 
one, for example, suddenly becomes a wholesaler, that issue is in a sense 
verifiable by reference to past purchases for internally generated needs and 
excess present purchases for non-internally generated needs. 
In these cases therefore, a court willingly intervenes with a term of good 
faith and then applies that term to ban the discretion exercised. On the other 
274. The comparative benefit approach, which looks at structural impediments to express 
contractual solutions to curb opportunism as a precondition for determining whether a law-supplied 
rule would produce efficiency improvements, can be utilized in a variety of contexts. Professors 
Stanley Longhofer and Stephen Peters use such a framework to assess the welfare improving effects 
of law supplied coordination rules in bankruptcy. See Stanley D. Longhofer & Stephen R. Peters, 
Protection for Whom? Creditor Conflicts in Bankruptcy (March 1997) (unpublished manuscript on 
file with author). 
275. u.c.c. § 2-306 (1997). 
276. Schwartz, supra note 24, at 296; see, e.g., Orange and Rockland Utils., Inc. v. Amerada 
Hess Corp., 397 N.Y.S.2d 814 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977). 
277. Schwartz, supra note 24, at 296. 
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hand, where there are "factors that affect [the party with discretion] much 
more than they affect otherwise similarly situated finns, "278 and are thus not 
systemic, the information is not readily verifiable and so a court declines to 
intervene. If a seller, for example, because of internal restructuring, curtails 
its output because of those factors peculiar to the seller, the court declines to 
intervene and permits the seller to curtail output without being found to 
violate the good faith component ofperformance.279 Schwartz argues that the 
non-intervention is explicable by the difficulty of verifying whether these 
factors peculiar to the seller, and not systemic, are legitimate. 280 
However, in the case of the seller curtailing output because of 
individualized non-systemic factors, the analysis to use in deciding whether 
the courts should intervene should begin with an analysis of the parties' goals 
(such as the reduction of contractual hazards). The court should then 
proceed to a comparative net benefit assessment of whether intervention is 
cost-justified. In the case of the seller reducing output due to individualized 
factors, such as the loss of an employee, the conduct involved does not seem 
to present a case of opportunistic behavior (or if it does involve opportunism, 
a court's intervention to assess it would be so costly as to outweigh any 
benefit to be derived from curbing the opportunism). The case of the buyer 
propelling itself into a new wholesaler status seems to involve a buyer 
manipulating its requirements to take advantage of a rising market, a clear 
case of opportunistic behavior. The court intervenes in the latter case 
because it assumes that parties have a shared goal of curbing opportunistic 
behavior, and because of sunk costs, bounded rationality and opportunism 
they will not effectively control such opportunistic hazards by contract. 281 
Thus, the court intervenes with an implied term of good faith where it is 
convinced that such law-supplied term will more effectively curb 
opportunism at a lower cost than the private devices parties might employ 
(such as screening, bonding, etc.)282 to curb opportunism. 
Professor Schwartz's verifiability analysis may enter into a determination 
of how costly it would be for the court to intervene but it is not the 
determinative factor. 
Another example Professor Schwartz uses to illustrate the importance of 
verifiability as a factor determining whether a court will intervene involves 
claims excuse for partial frustration. 283 As Professor Schwartz explains, a 
278. ld. 
279. ld. at 297-98. 
280. Jd. at 296-98. 
281. Kostritsky, Moral Hazard, supra note 25, at 651-53. 
282. ld. at 654-57 (discussing screening and bonding techniques). 
283. Schwartz, supra note 24, at 290-91. 
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paying party may claim such an excuse whenever "performance is worth less 
to him than he originally thought it would be. "284 Because it may be difficult 
for a court to ascertain "a paying party's profits, "285 a court will simply 
decline to intervene by denying the excuse claim. 286 
Although verifiability seems to be a factor, arguably there are other 
factors involved as well. One must begin with an analysis of whether 
crafting an implied excuse in such a case would maximize gains from trade 
or not. Arguably, implying such an excuse for a paying party simply 
because he is making less than anticipated would be sanctioning opportunistic 
behavior by the party claiming excuse particularly where "[t]he performing 
party has made relation-specific investments in many long-term contract 
situations. "287 
The difficulty with sanctioning "an out" with an implied excuse in the 
case described above, which might foster opportunism, is that there would 
actually be no reason to intervene. Doing so would actually increase a 
contractual hazard for the performing party and thereby lessen the overall 
gains from trade. The most cost-effective solution to the hazard might, 
therefore, be to decline to imply an excuse where implying an excuse would 
actually foster opportunism. Schwartz, however, would argue that the 
unwillingness to intervene in the case of the party claiming excuse (because 
he will make less on the deal than anticipated)288 is explained by the fact that 
intervention would involve the court in ascertaining matters that are 
unverifiable by the court. 289 Schwartz contrasts the results in claimed 
excuses by paying parties who will make less than anticipated290 (in which the 
excuse claims fail) with those excuses based on physical destruction of the 
property or governmental regulation (in which excuse claims regularly 
succeed). Schwartz posits that the difference in such cases is that of 
verifiability. 291 A court can easily verify whether physical destruction has 
occurred, or whether a governmental regulation affecting the contract has 
been implemented. 292 
While it is possible to rationalize the differing results in the cases 
according to Professor Schwartz's verifiability factor, doing so provides only 
284. /d. at 291. 
285. /d. at 292. 
286. /d. 
287. /d. at 291; see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 32, at 497. 
288. Schwartz, supra note 24, at 291. 
289. /d. at 292. 
290. /d. at 291-92. 
291. /d. at 292. 
292. /d. 
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an incomplete explanation of the courts' actions. While verifiability may 
factor into the cost/benefit analysis of the court's intervention, it does not by 
itself provide a rationale for intervention. The question should be how 
judicial intervention would achieve certain social welfare goals, including the 
maximization of joint gain. In the case of an excuse based on partial 
frustration by a party makh1g less than anticipated, the claimed excuse might 
well have the potential for fostering opportunism, particularly where the 
performing party has invested sunk costs. Courts hesitate to grant excuse in 
such cases and thereby mitigate the danger of opportunism. In the case of a 
claimed excuse based on the total destruction of property, the party claiming 
excuse is not acting opportunistically and granting an excuse will not 
promote such behavior in the future. 293 
While it is possible to point to a difference in the verifiability of 
information that forms the basis for the excuse, it cannot provide a 
comprehensive explanation for the behavior of courts in incomplete 
contracts. In some instances, courts are willing to supply certain terms such 
as good faith to constrain demands under requirements contracts even though 
a court's decision to intervene in the first place with the term of good faith is 
not by itself "verifiable." A court interpreting the term of good faith may, 
of course, by guided by verifiable information such as "the contract price, 
the market price, and the party's total sales ... under the contract and on the 
market, "294 but supplying the implied term of good faith ab initio is neither 
verifiable nor observable. Thus, the true reason for courts intervening with 
an implied term of good faith is to constrain opportunistic behavior by parties 
to a long-term supply contract.295 Decisions about whether intervention is 
justified will involve a cost benefit analysis of intervention, and such costs 
may include the verifiability or non-verifiability of information, but the 
verifiability of the information does not explain the intervention itself. One 
must formulate the intervention in terms of achieving social welfare goals. 
The court must ask: how would the adoption of an excuse, or of a term of 
good faith, or some other form of completing an incomplete contract achieve 
joint wealth maximization? 
A fmal example that Schwartz uses to illustrate the central role of the 
verifiability factor is the court's ready willingness to imply excuse in the 
293. /d. at 286 (noting that "[pJerfonning parties cannot affect the probability or impact of the 
exogenous events."). 
294. /d. at 298. 
295. Steven Button, Breach of Contract and the Comnwn Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 
94 HARV. L. REV. 369 (1980); Timothy I. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of 
Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REv. 521, 522 (1981). 
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cases of physical destruction or supervening governmental regulation.296 In 
both cases, courts readily grant excuse because it involves "action ... easy 
to verify. "297 
Yet, if one looks closely at the range of impracticability cases, including 
examples where a party claiming excuse is denied relief, it seems that 
verifiability alone is not the determinative factor in a court's intervention 
decision. 
Focusing on verifiability as the focal point of intervention erroneously 
suggests the reason for the court's intervention lies in the verifiability of 
certain factors. In fact, an explanation for a court's intervention should 
begin with an assessment of certain goals-such as the maximization of 
surplus, for example. The court should then proceed to determine whether a 
law-supplied term would advance or hinder the achievement of that goal. 
Finally, the court should assess whether the law-supplied good faith term 
would be able to achieve those goals at a lesser cost than private contractual 
arrangements or other private strategies. 
In the case of the requirements contract, a court faced with whether to 
intervene with a law-supplied term of good faith may determine that the law-
supplied term would be preferred on a comparative net benefit basis because 
it will be the most cost-effective means of controlling cases of recurring 
opportunism. However, in cases where the court assessing a quantity 
variation to see whether it comports with good faith would have to assess 
non-contractible or non-verifiable factors, it might determine that the cost of 
intervention would be too high or that no opportunism is involved. 
The robust explanatory power of a comparative net benefit approach can 
easily be seen by applying it to numerous examples in contracts· where the 
court may imply terms or liability rules to constrain recurring problems of 
opportunistic behavior, particularly where one party has invested or would 
have to invest sunk costs in a way that would make it vulnerable to 
expropriation. 298 Courts imply a ·term of irrevocability in subcontractor 
bidding cases to protect the sunk costs of general contractors. 299 Decision-
makers utilize section 90 to protect against the opportunistic exploitation of 
sunk costs invested by promisees. Courts regularly imply constructive 
conditions of exchange so that performances are construed as due 
simultaneously. They are in that fashion protected against the risk of having 
to sink costs when the other party is not ready and willing to perform. 
296. Schwartz, supra note 24, at 292. 
297. /d. 
298. Kostritsky, Why Infer?, supra note 106, at 552. 
299. /d. at 542. 
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In Section 45 contracts, where an offeror may, for example, offer a 
reward for the offeree performing a specified act, courts had to decide 
whether to imply a term of irrevocability based on an offeree's 
performance.300 Through Section 45, courts implied a subsidiary promise not 
to revoke the offer once part performance had begun. 301 In determining 
whether to imply such a promise of irrevocability, the court, a decision-
maker, should consider whether there are barriers which might interfere with 
private contractual solutions to the problem of opportunistic exploitation of 
an offeree's sunk costs. It may be difficult for the offeror to make the offer 
irrevocable in return for a certain number of interim steps because the 
offeror does not know in advance which steps to bargain for because she 
does not know which interim steps will yield successful results, and so, be 
worth bargaining for. Even if one were to focus on subsidiary arrangements 
in which the putative offeror fractionalized performance into a series of 
divisible steps and expressly bargained for each interim step, that could be 
quite a costly process. A legal decision-maker should consider the costs of 
such contractual arrangements as well as the costs of private strategies parties 
might employ to deter opportunism, such as screening all possible putative 
offerors in advance for their trustworthiness. 
In all of these cases, the rationale of a comparative net benefit analysis 
helps to explain the results more fully than a verifiability theory alone. 
Vill. CONCLUSION: ADVANTAGES OF THIS UNIFIED FRAMEWORK 
The framework provided by this Article, with its behavioral assumptions 
of bounded rationality and opportunism, transactional characteristics of asset 
specificity, as well as a comparative assessment of costs, would: (1) give 
better insights into the justification for legal intervention across different 
subject areas; (2) provide insights into the deficiencies of the hypothetical 
bargain theory-the traditional method for justifying many judicially-supplied 
terms and default rules in contracts; (3) demarcate the scope of penalty 
default rule methodology originated by Ayres and Gertner, and illustrate its 
limitations at least as a general means of resolving questions of law-supplied 
rules or terms; (4) provide a better structure for explaining and modifying 
certain doctrines in contract law including the Drennan rule; and (5) provide 
a unifying theory for judicial intervention and non-intervention which uses 
some of Alan Schwartz's factors, but which also challenges his conclusion 
that there are only "few cases in which the state can intervene optimally 
300. Kostritsky, Why Infer?, supra note 106, at 537. 
301. Id. 
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when transaction costs are the culprit. "302 This Article posits that indeed 
there are many cases of recurring problems of opportunism for which a law-
supplied rule appears cost-justified. Many apparently unrelated rules of 
contract law can be explained as a legal intervention designed to curb 
opportunistic behavior, a recurring problem in ongoing contractual relations, 
which may be difficult or costly to solve on a transaction-by-transaction 
basis. 
302. Schwartz, supra note 20, at 282. 
